The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisInstitute for International Economics, 2000 - 272 ˹éÒ The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected--Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
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... ( KLSE ) ceased to allow joint listings of 180 Malaysian companies on the SES . This move was followed in 1990 by the creation of a Singapore over - the - counter ( OTC ) market in Malaysian shares , known as the Central Limit Order Book ...
... KLSE . As a result , both Malaysian and Singaporean investors were forced to take their Malaysian shares out of the CLOB and transfer them directly to a Malaysian stockbro- ker or open an account in Malaysia to deal directly ; as we ...
... KLSE and Singapore Exchange ) Within 32 months of 31 March 2000 CLOB shares released to owners for trading on KLSE over 9 months from January 2003 1 percent administrative fee to KLSE affiliate based on average closing prices of shares ...
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BusinessGovernment Relations and Economic Vulnerability | 15 |
Tables | 16 |
4 The concentration of private economic power | 22 |
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