The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisInstitute for International Economics, 2000 - 272 ˹éÒ The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected--Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
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... Direct state intervention in the allocation of financial resources generated various well - known risks , including that of moral hazard . But efforts to liberalize the financial system also produced risk . Regula- tory agencies lacked ...
... direct investment ( Bres- nan 1993 , chap . 10 ; Winters 1996 , chap . 4 ; Felker and Jomo 1999 ) . At the same time , the government grouped 10 " strategic industries " under the Coordinating Agency for Strategic Industries controlled ...
... direct investment , and net portfolio investment ( RM million ) MIDA approvals FDIa Net portfolio investment 1997 July n.a. 983 - 3,932 August n.a. 976 - 5,347 September n.a. 863 - 7,038 October n.a. 855 -3,158 November n.a. 897 -4,198 ...
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BusinessGovernment Relations and Economic Vulnerability | 15 |
Tables | 16 |
4 The concentration of private economic power | 22 |
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