The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisInstitute for International Economics, 2000 - 272 ˹éÒ The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected--Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
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... vulnerable to crises , and the coverage in place was limited in both scope and depth . Although many were adversely affected by the crisis , those hardest hit included urban workers in lower - paid construction and manu- facturing jobs ...
... vulnerable . In general , however , economic concentration implies that private actors can bring relatively large ... vulnerability is the pursuit of policies that generated moral hazard . With the exception of insurance for small deposi ...
... vulnerability or when crises break , markets are highly sensitive to indica- tions that the government is unwilling or unable to ... vulnerable to crisis ( table 2.1 ) : electoral and non - electoral challenges to incumbent governments ...
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BusinessGovernment Relations and Economic Vulnerability | 15 |
Tables | 16 |
4 The concentration of private economic power | 22 |
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