The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisInstitute for International Economics, 2000 - 272 ˹éÒ The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected--Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
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... weak , and weakly enforced , lending limits to related managers and enterprises ; permissive asset classifi- cation systems and provisioning rules ; and , in general , poor disclosure and transparency of bank operations . These problems ...
... weak ones were left open . Korea's record in disposing of acquired assets seems weak , but it moved more aggressively than Indonesia , Malaysia , or Thailand . The Thai government under Chavalit initially supported weak finance ...
... Weakness or outright capture of the bank licensing process contributed powerfully to Indonesia's banking - sector ... weak , have led some analysts to downplay the significance of legal rules and to celebrate the advantages of ...
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BusinessGovernment Relations and Economic Vulnerability | 15 |
Tables | 16 |
4 The concentration of private economic power | 22 |
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