347 U.S. Opinion of the Court. ALTON v. ALTON. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 531. Argued April 7, 1954. Decided June 1, 1954. An action for divorce in the District Court of the Virgin Islands by the wife of a Connecticut domiciliary was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. While a review of that decision was pending here, the husband obtained a final divorce in a Connecticut state court. Held: In the circumstances stated in the opinion, the judgment of the District Court of the Virgin Islands must be vacated and the cause dismissed as moot. 207 F. 2d 667, judgment vacated and cause remanded. Abe Fortas and George H. T. Dudley argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief was Milton V. Freeman. Hyman Smollar submitted the cause on brief for respondent. PER CURIAM. Petitioner brought this action for divorce in the Virgin Islands. Following argument and submission of the case in this Court, we were authoritatively advised that a final divorce decree had been entered on April 28, 1954, in the State of Connecticut on application of the respondent. The Superior Court of Connecticut found respondent to be a domiciliary of that State and petitioner here personally appeared in that action. Petitioner does not suggest that she repudiates her appearance in the Connecticut action, that the Connecticut decree is invalid in any way, or, in fact, that there is any colorable basis for challenging it. Nor does petitioner seek any ancillary relief in the instant divorce action that could not be obtained in an independent action in the Virgin Islands. 610 Opinion of the Court. On the premises, this case appears to be moot. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the proceeding upon the ground that the cause is moot. MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents. He is of the opinion that petitioner is entitled to have her divorce case tried in the Virgin Islands since under the holding and opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, the Connecticut divorce decree does not necessarily protect petitioner from conviction for bigamy in the Virgin Islands or anywhere else. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Syllabus. 347 U.S. UNITED STATES v. HARRISS ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 32. Argued October 19, 1953-Decided June 7, 1954. 1. As here construed, §§ 305, 307 and 308 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act are not too vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of due process. Pp. 617-624. (a) If the general class of offenses to which a statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise. P. 618. (b) If this general class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, the Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction. P. 618. (c) Section 307 limits the coverage of the Act to those "persons" (except specified political committees) who solicit, collect, or receive contributions of money or other thing of value, and then only if one of the main purposes of either the persons or the contributions is to aid in the accomplishment of the aims set forth in § 307 (a) and (b). Pp. 618-620, 621–623. (d) The purposes set forth in § 307 (a) and (b) are here construed to refer only to "lobbying in its commonly accepted sense"to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or proposed legislation. Pp. 620-621. (e) The "principal purpose" requirement was adopted merely to exclude from the scope of § 307 those contributions and persons having only an "incidental" purpose of influencing legislation. It does not exclude a contribution which in substantial part is to be used to influence legislation through direct communication with Congress or a person whose activities in substantial part are directed to influencing legislation through direct communication with Congress. Pp. 621-623. (f) There are three prerequisites to coverage under §§ 307, 305 and 308: (1) the "person" must have solicited, collected or received contributions; (2) one of the main purposes of such "person," or one of the main purposes of such contributions, must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation 612 Opinion of the Court. by Congress; and (3) the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct communication with members of Congress. P. 623. 2. As thus construed, §§ 305 and 308 do not violate the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment-freedom to speak, publish and petition the Government. Pp. 625-626. 3. In this case, it is unnecessary for the Court to pass on the contention that the penalty provision in § 310 (b) violates the First Amendment. Pp. 626-627. (a) Section 310 (b) has not yet been applied to appellees, and it will never be so applied if appellees are found innocent of the charges against them. P. 627. (b) The elimination of § 310 (b) would still leave a statute defining specific duties and providing a specific penalty for violation of any such duty, and the separability provision of the Act can be given effect if § 310 (b) should ultimately be found invalid. P. 627. 109 F. Supp. 641, reversed. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins. Walter J. Cummings, Jr., then Solicitor General, filed the Statement as to Jurisdiction. Burton K. Wheeler argued the cause for Harriss, appellee. With him on the brief was Edward K. Wheeler. Hugh Howell argued the cause for Linder, Commissioner of Agriculture of Georgia, appellee. With him on the brief was Victor Davidson. Ralph W. Moore, appellee, submitted on brief pro se. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellees were charged by information with violation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 812, 839, 2 U. S. C. §§ 261-270. Relying on its previous Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. decision in National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, vacated as moot, 344 U. S. 804, the District Court dismissed the information on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional. 109 F. Supp. 641. The case is here on direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731. Seven counts of the information are laid under § 305, which requires designated reports to Congress from every person "receiving any contributions or expending any money" for the purpose of influencing the passage or defeat of any legislation by Congress. One such count charges the National Farm Committee, a Texas corpora 1 Section 305 provides: "(a) Every person receiving any contributions or expending any money for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307 shall file with the Clerk between the first and tenth day of each calendar quarter, a statement containing complete as of the day next preceding the date of filing "(1) the name and address of each person who has made a contribution of $500 or more not mentioned in the preceding report; except that the first report filed pursuant to this title shall contain the name and address of each person who has made any contribution of $500 or more to such person since the effective date of this title; "(2) the total sum of the contributions made to or for such person during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (1); "(3) the total sum of all contributions made to or for such person during the calendar year; "(4) the name and address of each person to whom an expenditure in one or more items of the aggregate amount or value, within the calendar year, of $10 or more has been made by or on behalf of such person, and the amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure; "(5) the total sum of all expenditures made by or on behalf of such person during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (4); "(6) the total sum of expenditures made by or on behalf of such person during the calendar year. "(b) The statements required to be filed by subsection (a) shall be cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate, but where |