which he now postulates in faith as to be realized. But this was not all. The fulness (Tλnpwμa) of the Gentiles will come in (Rom. 11:25; cf. Eph. 1:9, 10), for God's mercy will be shared by all (Rom. 11:32); everyone in the heavens, on earth and in the abyss, will revere the name of Jesus and acknowledge him as Christ and Lord (Phil. 2:10, 11; cf. Rom. 10:9; I Cor. 12:3); and so in Christ shall all be made alive (I Cor. 15:22). Even the redemption of the "whole creation" from the "bondage of corruption" is to be accomplished (Rom. 8:19-22). This is "the end" (Tò Téλos, I Cor. 15:24)—the goal, "the one divine, far-off event, to which the whole creation moves,' when, his work finished, Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the Father (vs. 24), unto whom are all things (Rom. 11:36), in order that God may be all in all (I Cor. 15:28). But there are certain elements of contingency attached to the fulfilment of this confident prediction. In any case the time to be covered by this rule of Christ before the final consummation is agelong (alános, II Thess. 1:9), an indefinitely long period, during which the sinful and unbelieving suffer punishment; the only alternative to this view, apart from the hypothesis of interpolation, is to hold that Second Thessalonians as a whole, if written by Paul, represents an earlier and afterward transcended point of view in the Pauline eschatology—a supposition as unnecessary to make as it is difficult to prove. But more striking still is the fact that the salvation of all Israel, which is predicted in full assurance of faith as a central element in the final glorious consummation, was just previously spoken of as conditioned on their not continuing in their unbelief (Rom. 11:23). It seems a fair inference, then, to conclude that, abstractly considered, the final salvation of all was, in Paul's judgment, contingent both as to time and as to the fact itself; but that his faith in Christ was so unlimited that he confidently believed that he would finally accomplish this, which was the purpose of his, as well as of the Father's (Col. 1:19, 20; Eph. 1:9, 10) universal love. 22 Paul recognized that universal salvation of persons possessing the power to continue in 21 Cf. Beyschlag, New Testament Theology, II, 279. 22 Kennedy, who argues for a different interpretation of Paul's doctrine of the Consummation, admits that the apostle taught the universal scope of the divine purpose of mercy (St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things, 309). unbelief, is, in the nature of the case, hypothetical; but he nevertheless firmly believed in its future realization, because he believed that Christ would never abandon his undertaking until he should see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied. Remembering that Paul held that Christ works out his redemptive purposes for the world in part, at least, through those whom he has already saved (I Cor. 9:1; 16:10; Col. 1:29; Eph. 3:20), so that steadfast continuance in the work of the Lord was an essential factor in bringing to pass the desired result (I Cor. 15:58; cf. II Thess. 3:13; Gal. 6:9, 10), one cannot well conceive an eschatology more dynamic and vital or more manifestly pragmatic. It would seem then that it was the pursuit of his great ethicoreligious purpose (personal and missionary) that not only in large measure gave rise to the great, central doctrines of the apostle but also furnished him with his supreme test of their truth. Now, in this, Paul at any rate practiced what the modern pragmatist preaches. 23 Was Paul then a pragmatist? Apart from the incongruity of the name, it is further true that Paul was not fully conscious of the pragmatic method of his theological thinking, except perhaps in his argument for the resurrection. His own theory of his thinking would have made him out to be what the modern man would call a mystic, rather than a pragmatist. But as we have seen, the pragmatic criterion is constantly made superior to the mystical. It is perhaps best to say that Paul was a vitalist, so far as the method of his thinking was concerned; his theology was constituted primarily of those judgments which he discovered to be essential to the best type of religious life. Now there is nothing abnormal about this method. It is the genuinely and freely human way of arriving at moral and religious convictions. Of course Paul's view of man and the world was prescientific, and much of the form of his doctrine was ephemeral, chiefly on that account. Besides this it must be acknowledged that "several of Paul's arguments lost much if not all of their original point once they were carried beyond the radius of his polemic against the Jews and Jewish Christians of his own day."24 That is, some of his teaching was of but temporary value, just because of a pronounced 23 Cf. Schiller, Humanism, Preface and pp. 6-8. 24 Moffatt, Paul and Paulinism, 72. but narrow pragmatism. But it is likewise true that the permanent (because universally vital) element in his teaching found place there mainly because of its broad and profoundly human pragmatism. The mere fact of the employment of the pragmatic method is no guaranty of truth, especially in the spiritual realm; it must be employed with great comprehensiveness and insight and discrimination. But the vital kernel of the Pauline system: God as the God and Father of Jesus Christ; reconciliation to the gracious Father through ethical faith; morality as the free expression of unselfish love, in place of legalism; the ethical immanence of God in the spirit of the truly Christian man; immortality as essential to the validity of the highest morality, and finally, his working Christian optimism -these are our permanent possessions just because they are so genuinely pragmatic, so vital, so deeply and essentially human. THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT REV. JOHN J. MARTIN, PH.D. The doctrine of the atonement in history has taken two distinctively main courses, represented by the names of Anselm who may be looked upon as the author of the objective theory, and Abelard who, inasmuch as he was the first to look upon the work of Christ as purely a revelation, may be named the father of the subjective theory. Between these two schools of theological thought discussion has oscillated until our own day. Recently interest in the doctrine has revived, and necessity for a new statement has been commandingly felt. Among the forces making this imperative have been: first, new conceptions of the principles and methods by which God acts vitally in the world and spiritually in history; second, the evolution of a specialized social sense, evolved out of recent social revolutions and from modern commercial and industrial changes; third, a better and more accurate knowledge of biblical theology; and, fourth, a keener and more adequate appreciation of personality. These are changes which the religious thinker who would escape moral censure can neither ignore nor evade. This article does not presume to express all that may be said on the atonement. Its main purpose is to bring into relief certain of its essentially constituent elements. We shall therefore introduce our details by a number of general statements by means of which irrelevant questions may be forestalled, our thoughts become more directly focused, and our mental eye trained for the important thing. I. GENERAL STATEMENTS First, the atonement is not a definition or doctrinal formula. It is a spiritual fact and principle. If therefore we are helpless to give to it philosophical harmony and unable to find an acceptable mode in which to express it, the thing itself is not in the least thereby affected. Experience of moral and spiritual values does not begin nor is it increased with definition. By its very nature it is entirely independent of our mental keenness for logical distinctions. Second, the atonement, to be effectually preached, must be realized as a present power with meaning. It cannot otherwise excite and sustain intelligent devotion. It is the great central fact of Christian experience, and experience being what it is, it imperatively challenges interpretation. No one can pass beyond the alternatives of Christian infancy into the reflections of Christian living without meeting the question of Anselm, Why God in man? and also the great fact homed at its heart. The church is saying that the destiny of men is wrapped up with Christ and his work, and the question inevitably erects itself, How? The preacher tells men that Jesus Christ produces those dynamic conditions in which human life is brought from its lowest registers of vitality to its richest promise and fullest expression of power. And men ask, How? And they cannot well believe until in some measure, at least, the matter is brought livingly home to mind and conscience and heart. The demands of these questions are natural and inevitable, and the moral strength and spiritual efficacy of the church of Christ is regulated by the freshness with which she makes her answer to these religious inquiries. Her power with God and among men is proportioned by her mental grip, her moral appreciation, and her spiritual appropriation of this great central fact and basic principle, so appropriate to human need. Third, the nature of the atonement will not easily come to view, so long as particular world-views are allowed to intrude themselves. When we are thinking of the personal relations of the soul to God, we can well afford to lay our world-views aside. The world-views of Greek and Roman thinkers, to whom the Cross was a foolishness and a world-scandal, have done more through Augustine and later through the neo-Platonism of Spinoza to shape the ideas of the church than has been to the interests of the kingdom of God or the comfort of men. Today we are imperiled by a paralysis of thought, so far as the atonement is concerned, through monistic world-views, which resolve God into a dull, diffusive, impersonal force, find the Cross a difficulty rather than a revelation, have no place for penitence and the forgive 1 Cf. J. Theo. Merz, History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 29, 30. |