seems in conflict with the God of popular thought. Nevertheless God is one, and we must guard ourselves against an attitude of opposition to modern science and philosophy.

Upon the whole the work is stimulating and helpful. Some of the conclusions are not as definite as could be desired and, at times, we feel that the presentation of a controverted point has not been so fair and complete as we would like. Yet we must regard the limits imposed by a single volume upon free discussion and expression. We believe that at least the work will introduce, in an intelligible way, problems that carry their own impulse to more detailed consideration.

DENVER, COLO.

WILLIAM THEODORE PAULLIN

In a recent book5 Dr. Buckham has entertainingly discussed various implications of the category of personality. His major attention, however, is devoted to a consideration of the problem of the self and the nature of personalism.

At the beginning the author is confronted with the old problem, Is there a workable line of demarkation between animals and men? He decides that "the kind of capacity" constitutes a dividing line which "nothing can obliterate" (p. 30). Is the chasm then impassable? The answer is cautiously guarded: on the one hand, we may speak of a "germinal" or "potential" personality in domestic animals; but we may not speak of a "real personality" in this connection. "That this potential personality will ever become actual personality in the individual animal, in some other state of existence, no one can absolutely affirm or deny" (p. 29). And, on the other hand, it is difficult to find, in the lowest types of humanity, "any trace of that regality we call personality; yet who doubts that it is there, if only it can be awakened and developed" (p. 30)?

The author's primary interest, however, is in man. His thesis is that in every human being there is a conflict between the "empirical self" and the "True Self"; and that this conflict indicates an opportunity for the achievement of personality. "Whether the True Self. the empirical self . . . . is to win and rule, depends upon the Will" (p. 80). The empirical self belongs to the phenomenal order: it is "the product of an evolutionary series that goes back to the primordial germ" (p. 191); it is "the self of moods, the plaything of circumstances and environment" (p. 72); its conscious activity is on the level of "under

5 Personality and the Christian Ideal. A Discussion of Personality in the Light of Christianity. By J. W. Buckham. Boston and Chicago: The Pilgrim Press, 1910. xvi+263 pages. $1.50.

standing, feeling, conation" (p. 71); it is not "an immoral self. It is simply unmoral" (p. 76). But when the will yields to the natural desires of the empirical self then "an act is committed which tends to deform the empirical self and constitute an anti-self" (p. 81). This anti-self is "no part of our original self-hood; it is a self that each of us constructs de novo" (p. 80). It becomes "an actual, enslaving, pseudo-self"; it "finds other spirits worse than itself and develops in their company" (p. 82); it joins that "kingdom of anti-selves" which is "the curse, and the only curse, of existence" (p. 83). And yet this anti-self, "as compared with the True Self," has no "genuine reality whatever" (p. 82). The "True Self" belongs to the noumenal order: it is not "an evolution from below" but "an impartation from above" (p. 191); it is "the self that transcends experience, that partakes of the universal" (p. 62); it is "not moved by physical conditions and states, except with its own consent" (p. 106); it introduces "order, harmony, end-serving" into this "unmoral, unregulated, purposeless world of sense" (p. 77); it is the "indestructible center of human salvability . . . . incapable of absolute perversion" (p. 82); it is "the Christ within" (p. 260); it is a co-operating member in "a society of persons, a Kingdom of God" (p. 131).

The nature of personalism may be defined by contrasting individuality and personality. The former has to do with "the natural order": it is a "distinctively racial product" (p. 33); it is a "time product” (p. 37); it is associated with the natural, the phenomenal, facts, science (p. 249). The latter has to do with "the eternal order": it is "an intrinsic reality" (p. 33); it is "a supertemporal noumenon" (p. 37); its constituent elements are self-consciousness, unity, freedom, worth; it is in its very nature "universal" (p. 39); it is associated with the spiritual, the noumenal, verities, ontology (p. 249). It is impossible, however, to find "a mere human individual, uncompounded with personality" (p. 34). In fact each human being "belongs to two orders of existence the eternal order and the time order," i.e., man "belongs to the first and inhabits the second" (p. 188). "The person . . . . is in the individual, as the nucleus is within the cell" (p. 38); he can "neither be born nor grow old nor die" (p. 37); he is a unique “end in himself," and may realize himself only in association with his fellows. (p. 21); his empirical uniqueness consists in his specific type of individuality, his spiritual uniqueness in his specific type of character (p. 28).

Now, Jesus discerned this personality in every man; he counted everything as means to the achievement of the one end, personality;

he established in his daily life the basic principle of conduct-man is to meet man on the level of ends, as person to person. In his own person there was a remarkable and exceptional union "of vitality and harmony, of enthusiasm and serenity." He was "aflame with zeal, and yet, like the burning bush, he was not consumed. . . . He was the radium of the moral world, constantly irradiating moral and spiritual force, yet with undiminished supply" (p. 195). He left "no ideal unfulfilled" (p. 205); he was "the perfect human person" (p. 194); he possessed "incomparable purity of moral insight and motive'. . . integrity of moral fiber . . . . wholeness and harmony of moral quality . . . . greatness and splendor of moral achievement." Such qualities make him "transcendent, archetypal, ideal” (p. 194). To him, however, we may not ascribe "absolute perfection," but only to "the Eternal Word" (p. 194). "He is the Goal . . . . of human aspiration and achievement" (p. 200); and by following Jesus Christ we may best. achieve our moral self-development.

Just a word may be said concerning three points. Has not the author virtually reinstated the Platonic dualism? "Impartation," just as certainly as "participation," presupposes two worlds. The dualism which is based upon a world of discourse is not to be confused with that which is based upon a Ptolemaic theory of the universe. In the entire discussion we find no explanation of "personality"-it is simply given, it is imparted to man by God. In the second place, the author employs the theory of imitation (p. 44) to account for the development of the consciousness of meaning. But imitation presupposes social consciousness; and becomes comprehensible only when there is a consciousness of other selves. On this theory of imitation, how explain the fact that the action of one form, in a contest for the protection of life, calls out in another form a diametrically opposite reaction? Again, during the first year, are not the parents more imitative than the child? Finally, Dr. Buckham virtually forfeits the primary basis for any real explanation of that which he is most interested in-ideals. I quote: "Ideals, aspirations, convictions, valuations . . . . come not at all within the purview of science (except in pyschology, and there only on the physiological side) . . . . " (p. 250). Just what peculiar advantage has physiological psychology over social psychology in the study of ideals? Are ideals merely imparted to the individual, or does the individual really construct his ideals? In either event it would seem fitting, in the study of the inevitably accompanying psychical processes, to elevate psychology into major significance.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

C. A. EXLEY

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.