The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisColumbia University Press, 1 ต.ค. 2010 - 304 หน้า The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 56
หน้า ix
... assets The concentration of private economic power Ownership of South Korean business groups by insiders Indicators of corruption Political constraints on crisis management: The incumbents Interest rates, exchange rates, and stock ...
... assets The concentration of private economic power Ownership of South Korean business groups by insiders Indicators of corruption Political constraints on crisis management: The incumbents Interest rates, exchange rates, and stock ...
หน้า 2
... asset during the period of high growth generated moral hazard, distorted the liberalization process, increased vulnerability to shocks, and complicated the adjustment process once the crisis hit. Reducing the risks of crisis in the ...
... asset during the period of high growth generated moral hazard, distorted the liberalization process, increased vulnerability to shocks, and complicated the adjustment process once the crisis hit. Reducing the risks of crisis in the ...
หน้า 6
... asset classification systems and provisioning rules; and, in general, poor disclosure and transparency of bank operations. These problems compounded the effects of weak institutional development by the banks themselves, which tended to ...
... asset classification systems and provisioning rules; and, in general, poor disclosure and transparency of bank operations. These problems compounded the effects of weak institutional development by the banks themselves, which tended to ...
หน้า 7
... asset prices started to fall, collateral values also fell, and the illiquidity and insolvency of financial institutions became apparent. This development in turn forced banks either to curtail lending or cease operations altogether ...
... asset prices started to fall, collateral values also fell, and the illiquidity and insolvency of financial institutions became apparent. This development in turn forced banks either to curtail lending or cease operations altogether ...
หน้า 17
คุณถึงขีดจำกัดการดูหนังสือเล่มนี้แล้ว.
คุณถึงขีดจำกัดการดูหนังสือเล่มนี้แล้ว.
เนื้อหา
1 | |
15 | |
Ch
2 Incumbent Governments and the Politics of Crisis Management | 47 |
Ch 3 Crisis Political Change and Economic Reform | 86 |
Ch 4 The Politics of Financial and Corporate Restructuring | 139 |
Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract | 183 |
A New Asian Miracle | 217 |
References | 239 |
Index | 255 |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
administrative Anwar Asia ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS assets authoritarian banking sector bankruptcy billion bumiputra business-government relations capital central bank chaebol chapter Chinese Chuan CLOB coalition controls corporate governance corporate restructuring corruption countries country’s crises CRISIS MANAGEMENT Danaharta debt democracies democratic Development Eastern Economic Review ECONOMIC REFORM effects efforts elections electoral finance companies financial and corporate financial institutions financial sector firms fiscal foreign funds Golkar government’s groups growth Habibie Hanbo IBRA important incentives increase INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS Indonesia industrial initial interest investment investors issues Jomo Kim Dae Jung Kim Young Kim Young Sam labor legislative liberalization Mahathir Malaysia ment moral hazard National opposition particularly party percent Philippines POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMY president private sector problems recapitalization region regulatory Renong ringgit risk role rule share social contract South Korea state-owned strategy substantial Suharto Table Thai Thailand tion transparency UMNO urban vulnerable World Bank