ready called first and second forms of self-activity. Aristotle uses the word entelechy (¿vreλéxtia) to express this idea.

Aristotle's technique has led to much misunderstanding. His use of the terms matter (An, hule) and form (ɛidos) as though mere correlations, and his polemic against Plato's doctrine of Ideas has led to the opinion that he held solely to the view of ordinary common-sense realism, and repudiated self-activity as the independent and self-existent.

But one may easily see how erroneous this is, by considering his definition of matter, or material cause. For, according to Aristotle, matter is mere capacity or possibility, and it is the form that gives it actuality. The form-giving cause produces any and all manifestations in what is called matter. Hence any reality in matter is due to its form, and matter by itself would be pure nothing. "Nothing," in the sense that it is the void in which may be created something, is pretty much identical with Aristotle's van (hyle). But, again, any reality may be the material as regards a new impress of formative energythe stuff for new realities. Aristotle holds, moreover, to the self-existence and absoluteness of pure energy as active reason, the vous (nous) which he describes in the third book of his far-famed treatise on the Soul, (chapters v., vi..) as the creator of all things, and that by which all things are perceived in the passive reason. This is separated from the body and not correlated with the forces of nature (ànabés). Its activity which he describes in the Ethics (book x.), and especially in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics, as theoretical insight, EpEr is entirely perfect self-activity, and independent of all correlation, although it is related creatively to all things in the universe. This creative reason it is (he intimates in his Psychology iii-v.), which makes possible the sense-perception of, and the scientific investigation of objects in nature. The activity of you's or reason (called intellectus by the Romanic peoples is intuitive and immediate insight such as we have into our highest categories such as being, cause, essence, matter, quantity and quality (whether we are able to consider those abstractly as in philosophy, or only use them concretely in sense-perception, and are entirely unaware of them as categories by themselves). For in all sense-perception there goes on a recognition of objects-an interpretation, as it were, of

objects into what we already know and are familiar with, by the very nature of our minds. This view is outlined by Aristotle in his Psychology (II., ch. ii.,) in the passage where he calls our attention to the fact that sense-perception takes or apprehends the forms of objects and not their matter.

Nutrition, or the activity of the plant-soul (rò opentinóv) receives its environment into its organism as food, and converts or assimilates it by its activity, making it into vegetable cells. But in sense-perception the environment is not devoured, consumed, nor added to the soul. Instead of appropriating it the soul creates within itself by its self-activity the essential form of the object, and by this perceives it. Perception is not purely passive then, but a real and true self-activity of a higher order than nutrition. And even nutrition is a real manifestation of self-activity. For the living being, the plant, reäcts on its environment and attacks and consumes it. Destroying the form that it finds, it uses it as matter and imposes a new form on it, and makes it into vegetable cells.

But sense-perception, on the occasion of the presence of the object, assumes the essential form of that object-becomes as it were that object; forming for itself an image of it, or a definition of it, causing as it were the environment which is presented in the outer court of its nerves of sense to be modelled within itself. In other words, the soul being essential form or formative principle, perceives by imitating the forms of things present in its environment. The essential particulars of form are creatively produced within the soul and recognised there by means of the categories which constitute the essential form. of the mind, or categories which are the essential definitions. of itself created by the soul as formative activity. Hence perception is essentially recognition-a translating of the environment into terms of the self.

The creative reason,―called by the commentators since Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Nov's nointixos is, therefore, rightly to be deemed the power of all perception and understanding in us. It is the highest that makes possible the lowest. It is creative reason that makes possible even the inorganic world. It is the same creative reason which is in our soul that makes possible our humblest sense-perceptions. But our understanding is above sense-perception inasmuch as

it deals consciously with the elements of the definition of objects. The definition discovers and announces what features are essential to the form of the object; and the form of the object is its reality. Hence the diavola or discursive understanding—and this belongs to the passive reason according to the Psychology of Aristotle (III., v.)—which investigates objects in their relations and in their general predicates, comes to discriminate by degrees the general and eternal elements of form in the definition of objects, and acquires the ability to grasp them by themselves apart from objects. It thus comes to be able to think of space, time, substance, quantity, quality, mode, identity, difference, unity, cause, relation, potentiality, actuality and being, in and for themselves, and to see in them the self-activity of the soul itself, its own definition as it were. Thus it mounts up to Reason itself which sees directly the Form of Forms, or the Cause of all Causes, the Divine Creative Idea.

In this, as before remarked, Aristotle substantially repeats Plato. In his Phædrus (97 C.) Platô calls Reason the cause of the universe in time and space, and in his Philebus (28 C.) he poetically calls it "the king of heaven and earth." Aristotle in his polemic against Plato's Doctrine of Ideas fails to quote those passages wherein Platô makes the supreme and essential being to be pure self-related activity, incorporeal and eternal. Platô is very careful to connect with his ideas and attribute to them such activity as is involved in creation and thought. It is true that he calls this rational activity self-movement, (Laws X., 894 A.) but it is only a quarrel over words to criticise this expression when its definition is laid down and the genera which it includes are mentioned and it is expressly asserted that such self-movement is incorporeal. Aristotle laid great stress on the fact that the first source of motion-primum mobile-is itself unmoved. In this he is right so far as spatial movement is concerned. The self-activity is a perpetual movement out of difference into identity with itself, and through difference again back to identity, and therefore remains for and by itself, and certainly does not have spatial movement nor change in the sense of finite things.

This is sufficiently emphasised too by Platô. That Platô and Aristotle agree in this is the view taken by the Neo

Platonists from the time of Ammonios Sakkas down to Proklos, The Scholastics hold the same view.

St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. xiii) says: "There is no difference between Plato's "First Self-Mover" and Aristotle's "First Unmoved ;" and referring to Plato's Laws, Tenth book, and to Aristotle's Physics, Books III. and VI. he continues: "According to Platô the selfmoved is not a material body. Platô takes motion in the sense of operatio or intellectual action. The activity of the intellect and will and the love of God are called self-movement by Platô." Although Aristotle in the sixth book of the Physics holds that movement can be predicated only of what is divisible and corporeal, and also what is potential but not wholly real (Book III.), yet this does not contradict the thought of Plato, but only his use of words. Platô would make a special designation for this new and wonderful thought which he has discovered, and he designates it self-movement as though in contrast to motion through others- the species of motion which sense-perception talks about as though it were the ultimate form of things.

Aristotle invented the word vépуɛiα, energeia, or internal activity and he also made frequent use of èvreλéxεiα (entelecheia or having-of-completion within itself—to paraphrase its meaning) in order to express self-existent activity. Quibbles and objections could easily be made against these expressions. The sensuous meaning of the words ἔργον, τέλος and ἔχω could be defined and shown to be incompatible with spiritual significa

tions.

For Sense as we have seen takes a fundamentally different view of the world from Reason. According to "common sense," quiescent being is first, and thinking activity is afterward, as a function of said being. But the Reason says that self-activity is the basis of being. Indeed this is so stated in religion. God, the creator, creates by a creative thought. Time and space and all existence subsist in the divine thought. Here existence is the result of thinking; and God's thinking, too, is the immanent cause of his existence. He eternally IS, in his thinking; and his thinking eternally sets forth his divine form (os) as Reason. Without this thinking he would be

formless and a pure nothing, and there would be no creation of a world. But divine thinking is divine self-distinction, and from it flows creation.

In the tenth book of his Ethics (ch. vii.) Aristotle expands upon the character of this divine activity-the pure energy of the formal cause and of the human analogy to it.

"If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the virtue of the best part of man. Whether then, this best part be the intellect, or something else (which is thought naturally to bear rule and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honorable and divine subjects; or whether it is itself divine or the most divine of any properties which we possess;) the energy of this part according to its proper virtue must be perfect happiness; and that this energy is contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what was said before, and with the truth: for this energy is the noblest; since the intellect is the noblest thing within us, and of subjects of knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant. It is also most permanent; for we are better able to contemplate continuously than to do anything else continuously." (Nic. Ethics X., ch. vii., Bohn's translation.)

"But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which is according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the Life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal, but so far as it is possible he should make himself immortal and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle, for this in power and value is more excellent within him than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's self, if it really is the ruling and the better part." (Ethics, Book X., ch. vii., Bohn's tr.) "That perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative energy, might be shown also from the following considerations; that we suppose the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy." (Ethics, Book X., ch. viii.)

"The energy of the Deity as it surpasses all others in blessedness must be contemplative, and therefore of human energies that which is nearest allied to this must be the happiest Happiness must

be a kind of contemplation," (ɛ@pia is creative knowing and not passive knowing as we often mean by the word knowledge.) (Nic. Eth. Bk. X., ch. viii.)