Hume's Treatise of Morals: And Selections from the Treatise of the Passions

Ginn & Company, 1893 - 275 ˹

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˹ 89 - I shall endeavor to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.
˹ 104 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
˹ 91 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
˹ 91 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
˹ 117 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, ' I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is...
˹ 118 - ... to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure, which virtue conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice. Now since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures...
˹ 178 - Tis selflove which is their real origin ; and as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are oblig'd to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public ; tho' it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors.
˹ 184 - ... of whatever is near and contiguous. This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest ; and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it.
˹ 101 - Accordingly we find, in common life, that men are principally concerned about those objects which are not much removed either in space or time, enjoying the present, and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to happen to-morrow, and he will lend you attention. The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house when abroad, and some hundred leagues...
˹ 188 - Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common : because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis...