Definitions of the term "conduct," p. 202 sq.-The meaning of the word "act,"
p. 203 sq.-The meaning of the word “intention," p. 204.-There can be
only one intention in one act, p. 204 sq.-The moral judgments which we
pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. 205 sq.
-A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.-A
deliberate wish is a volition, p. 206 sq.-The meaning of the word " motive,"
p. 207.-Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation,
ibid. —The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging
to another act, ibid.-Even motives which consist of non-volitional cona-
tions may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p.
207 sq.-Refutation of Mill's statement that the motive has nothing to
do with the morality of the action,” p. 208 sq.—Moral judgments really
passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract,
p. 209.-Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 sq.-Distinction
between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.-Moral judgments refer not
only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances,
but to omissions, p. 210 sq.-Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.
-Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this
not-willing is attributed to a defect of the "will," p. 211 sq.-Distinction
between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to
refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.-The "known concomitants of
acts," p. 213.-Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. 213 sq.
-The meaning of the term " conduct," p. 214.-The subject of a moral
judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will, or character, conceived as the
cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 sq.-Moral judg
ments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. 215 sq.