Thailand's CrisisInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000 - 275 หน้า This is a review of what the IMF did, who got hurt, what worked and what failed in the economic and social management of Thailand's economic crisis. It shows how political change got bound up with economic crisis, resulting in a new constitution, a seismic shift in the political landscape and greater asssertiveness by civil society. It examines how the economic turmoil changed the ways people reacted to political scandal, viewed their own society and imagined their future. The final chapters review the changes and lessons from 1997-2000 and speculate on how these changes will frame the future. |
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ผลการค้นหา 1 - 3 จาก 49
หน้า 8
... debt . The bust was so disastrous because bank debt could be withdrawn easily . Thai firms relied so heavily on bank debt because most were family businesses and because of “ the reluctance of family businesses to cede control to ...
... debt . The bust was so disastrous because bank debt could be withdrawn easily . Thai firms relied so heavily on bank debt because most were family businesses and because of “ the reluctance of family businesses to cede control to ...
หน้า 52
... debt was around US $ 70 billion . With the collapse of the currency , the baht value of this debt increased by half , swelling total debt in baht terms by around 15 percent.1 As part of the initial negotiations over the bailout , the ...
... debt was around US $ 70 billion . With the collapse of the currency , the baht value of this debt increased by half , swelling total debt in baht terms by around 15 percent.1 As part of the initial negotiations over the bailout , the ...
หน้า 227
... debt Prior to the crisis , the public sector's foreign debt ( including monetary authorities ) had stood at 17 billion US dollars , equivalent to around 10 percent of GDP ( Table 9.5 ) . By late 1999 , the foreign debt had doubled to 36 ...
... debt Prior to the crisis , the public sector's foreign debt ( including monetary authorities ) had stood at 17 billion US dollars , equivalent to around 10 percent of GDP ( Table 9.5 ) . By late 1999 , the foreign debt had doubled to 36 ...
เนื้อหา
The Political Economy of the Thai Crisis | 14 |
Thailand and the | 35 |
Social Impact Social Safety Net Social Bailout | 69 |
ลิขสิทธิ์ | |
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activists agenda agriculture Ammar Anand Panyarachun argued Asia Asian Aspiration Party assets Bangchak Bangkok Bangkok Bank Banharn Bank of Thailand became billion baht businessmen CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ central bank Chavalit Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Chuan chumchon civil society coalition collapse conglomerates constitution countries crises CRUZ The University culture currency debate debt democracy Democrat discourse early economic crisis elected elephant export farmers FIDF firms foreign funds globalization groups growth IMF's impact increased industries inflows institutions investment Japanese Krung Thai labour leaders loans major minister Ministry Miyazawa nationalist neoliberal NGOs numbers officials organizations package party Pasuk Pasuk Phongpaichit percent politicians poor Prawase Wasi programme protest provincial reform role rural scheme self-reliance social safety social safety net strategy Tarrin TDRI technocrats Thai economy Thai government Thai Rak Thai Thirayuth University Library UNIVERSITY urban village World Bank