Thailand's CrisisInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000 - 275 ˹éÒ This is a review of what the IMF did, who got hurt, what worked and what failed in the economic and social management of Thailand's economic crisis. It shows how political change got bound up with economic crisis, resulting in a new constitution, a seismic shift in the political landscape and greater asssertiveness by civil society. It examines how the economic turmoil changed the ways people reacted to political scandal, viewed their own society and imagined their future. The final chapters review the changes and lessons from 1997-2000 and speculate on how these changes will frame the future. |
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... loans on the other . It confronted the hedge funds and other currency speculators by playing poker in the foreign currency market with the international reserves . By the end of June 1997 , the reserves were almost fully committed to ...
... loans on the other . It confronted the hedge funds and other currency speculators by playing poker in the foreign currency market with the international reserves . By the end of June 1997 , the reserves were almost fully committed to ...
˹éÒ 41
... loans from the FIDF to balance the outflow of deposits . Most firms saw their balance sheets wrecked after July 2 when the decline of the baht increased their dollar- based liabilities , and the withdrawal of short - term funds ...
... loans from the FIDF to balance the outflow of deposits . Most firms saw their balance sheets wrecked after July 2 when the decline of the baht increased their dollar- based liabilities , and the withdrawal of short - term funds ...
˹éÒ 52
... loan portfolio deteriorated , and by early 1999 Krung Thai topped the ranking for the proportion of non- performing loans . Government was obliged to inject 77 billion baht of new capital in December 1998 , and another 108 billion in ...
... loan portfolio deteriorated , and by early 1999 Krung Thai topped the ranking for the proportion of non- performing loans . Government was obliged to inject 77 billion baht of new capital in December 1998 , and another 108 billion in ...
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The Political Economy of the Thai Crisis | 14 |
Thailand and the | 35 |
Social Impact Social Safety Net Social Bailout | 69 |
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activists agenda agriculture Ammar Anand Panyarachun argued Asia Asian Aspiration Party assets Bangchak Bangkok Bangkok Bank Banharn Bank of Thailand became billion baht businessmen CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ central bank Chavalit Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Chuan chumchon civil society coalition collapse conglomerates constitution countries crises CRUZ The University culture currency debate debt democracy Democrat discourse early economic crisis elected elephant export farmers FIDF firms foreign funds globalization groups growth IMF's impact increased industries inflows institutions investment Japanese Krung Thai labour leaders loans major minister Ministry Miyazawa nationalist neoliberal NGOs numbers officials organizations package party Pasuk Pasuk Phongpaichit percent politicians poor Prawase Wasi programme protest provincial reform role rural scheme self-reliance social safety social safety net strategy Tarrin TDRI technocrats Thai economy Thai government Thai Rak Thai Thirayuth University Library UNIVERSITY urban village World Bank