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moral concepts. There will then be a discussion of the phenomena to which such concepts are applied—the subjects of moral judgments. The general character of these phenomena will be scrutinised, and an answer sought to the question why facts of a certain type are matters of moral concern, while other facts are not. Finally, the most important of these phenomena will be classified, and the moral ideas relating to each class will be stated, and, so far as possible, explained.

An investigation of this kind cannot be confined to ideas and sentiments prevalent in any particular society, or at any particular stage of civilisation. Its subjectmatter is the moral consciousness of mankind at large. It consequently involves the survey of an unusually rich and varied field of research-psychological, ethnographical, historical, juridical, theological. In the present state of our knowledge, when monographs on most of the subjects involved are wanting, such an undertaking is probably too big for any man; at any rate it is much too big for the writer of this book. Nothing like completeness can be aimed at. Hypotheses of varying degrees of probability must only too often be resorted to. Even the certainty of the statements on which conclusions are based, is not always beyond a doubt. But though fully conscious of the many defects of his attempt, the author has nevertheless the temerity to think himself justified in placing it before the public. It seems to him that one of the most important objects of human speculation cannot be left in its present state of obscurity; that at least age of must be thrown upon it by re@ave extended over a dozen of years; and The Niples underlying the various customs PCA 950 N arrived at even without subjecting A gada a wok a full and minute treatment as www of an andropological monograph. Mex wok, spite of its theoretical char

dog papa de o se practical use. Though a de pont side of our nature, our moral

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opinions are in a large measure amenable to reason. in every society the traditional notions as to what is good or bad, obligatory or indifferent, are commonly accepted by the majority of people without further reflection. By tracing them to their source it will be found that not a few of these notions have their origin in sentimental likings and antipathies, to which a scrutinising and enlightened judge can attach little importance; whilst, on the other hand, he must account blameable many an act and omission which public opinion, out of thoughtlessness, treats with indifference. It will, moreover, appear that a moral estimate often survives the cause from which it sprang. And no unprejudiced person can help changing his views if he be persuaded that they have no foundation in existing facts.

CHAPTER I

PAS EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

Fear the moral concepts are ultimately based on emocions either of indignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of thinkers have in vain attempted to deny. The terms which embody these concepts must originally have been used-indeed they still constantly are so usedas direct expressions of such emotions with reference to the phenomena which evoked them. Men pronounced certain ders to be good or bad on account of the emotions those acts aroused in their minds, just as they called sunshine warm and ice cold on account of certain sensations which they experienced, and as they named a thing pleasant or perul because they felt pleasure or pain. But to attriSuce a quality to a thing is never the same as merely to side the existence of a particular sensation or feeling in De mind which perceives it. Such an attribution must mean that the thing, under certain circumstances, makes a sevda impression on the mind. By calling an object wear or petsant, a person asserts that it is apt to produce nyen a sensation of heat or a feeling of pleasure. Simi

að sér at det good or bad, ultimately implies That A gy to give rise to an emotion of approval or Cassovia hon who pronounces the judgment. Whilst as of age the actual existence of any specific emotion A de person judging or of anybody else, NAP a moral judgment attributes to the

Aoser to arouse an emotion. The moral

concepts, then, are essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions.

However, as is frequently the case with general terms, these concepts are mentioned without any distinct idea of their contents. The relation in which many of them stand to the moral emotions is complicated; the use of them is often vague; and ethical theorisers, instead of subjecting them to a careful analysis, have done their best to increase the confusion by adapting the meaning of the terms to fit their theories. Very commonly, in the definition of the goodness or badness of acts, reference is made, not to their tendencies to evoke emotions of approval or indignation, but to the causes of these tendencies, that is, to those qualities in the acts which call forth moral emotions. Thus, because good acts generally produce pleasure and bad acts pain, goodness and badness have been identified with the tendencies of acts to produce pleasure or pain. The following statement of Sir James Stephen is a clearly expressed instance of this confusion, so common among utilitarians:— 'Speaking generally, the acts which are called right do promote, or are supposed to promote general happiness, and the acts which are called wrong do diminish, or are supposed to diminish it. I say, therefore, that this is what the words 'right' and 'wrong' mean, just as the words up' and 'down' mean that which points from or towards the earth's centre of gravity, though they are used by millions who have not the least notion of the fact that such is their meaning, and though they were used for centuries and millenniums before any one was or even could be aware of it." So, too, Bentham maintained that words like "ought," "right," and "wrong," have no meaning unless interpreted in accordance with the principle of utility; and James Mill was of opinion that "the very morality" of the act lies, not in the sentiments raised in the breast of him who perceives or contemplates it, but in "the consequences of the act, good or evil, and their being

1 Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 338.

2 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 4.

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