is due for the kind reception I invariably received from peasants and mountaineers, not generally noted for friendliness towards Europeans.

I beg to express my best thanks to Mr. Stephen Gwynn for revising the first thirteen chapters, and to Mr. H. C. Minchin for revising the remaining portion of the book. To their suggestions I am indebted for the improvement of many phrases and expressions. I have likewise to thank my friend Mr. Alex. F. Shand for kindly reading the proofs of the earlier chapters and giving me the benefit of his opinion.

Throughout the work the reader will easily find how much I owe to British science and thought—a debt which is greater than I can ever express.

LONDON,

January, 1906.

E. W.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

The origin of the present investigation, p. 1.-Its subject-matter, p. 1 sq.-Its practical usefulness, p. 2 sq.

CHAPTER I

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.-The assumed universality or "objectivity" of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.-Theories according to which the moral predicates derive all their import from reason, "theoretical" or "practical," p. 7 sq.-Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.-This tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p. 9.-Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of

purely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.-Differences of an emotional origin, pp. 11-13.-Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. 13.— The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.—The origin and nature of this authority, pp. 14-17.-General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.-The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. 18.-The supposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. 18-20.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and approval, p. 21. The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a subspecies of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly emotion, ibid.-Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind towards a cause of pain, p. 22 sq.-Dr. Steinmetz's suggestion that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally "undirected, pp. 23-27.-The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this hypothesis, pp. 27-30.-The collective responsibility usually involved in the institution of the blood-feud, pp. 30-32.-Explanation of it, pp. 32-35.