and it is not in our power to discard these forms of speech." 1 I regard the so-called consequences of acts, in so far as they are intended, as acts by themselves, or as parts of acts.

The very expression "outward act" implies that acts also have an inner aspect. Intention, says Butler, "is part of the action itself." By intention I understand a volition or determination to realise the idea of a certain event; hence there can be only one intention in one act. Certain writers distinguish between the immediate and the remote intentions of an act. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape him, saved his victim from drowning with a view to inflicting upon him more exquisite tortures. The immediate intention, it is maintained, was to save the enemy from drowning, the remote intention was to inflict upon him tortures. But I should say that, in this case, we have to distinguish between two acts, of which the first was a means of producing the event belonging to the second, and that, when the former was accomplished, the latter was still only in preparation. A distinction has, moreover, been drawn between the direct and the indirect intention of an act :"If a Nihilist seeks to blow up a train containing an Emperor and others, his direct intention may be simply the destruction of the Emperor, but indirectly also he intends the destruction of the others who are in the train, since he is aware that their destruction will be necessarily included along with that of the Emperor." In this case we have two intentions, and, so far as I can see, two acts, provided that the nihilist succeeded in carrying out his intentions, namely (1) the blowing up of the train, and (2) the killing of the emperor; the former of these acts does not even necessarily involve the latter. But I fail to see that there is any intention at all to kill other 1 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, i. 427, 432 sq.

2 Butler, Dissertation II. Of the Nature of Virtue,' in Analogy of Religion, &c. p. 336.

3 Mackenzie, op. cit. p. 60. The

"4

example is borrowed from Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 27 note.

persons. Professor Sidgwick maintains that it would be thought absurd to say that, in such a case, the nihilist "did not intend" to kill them; but the reason for this is simply the vagueness of language, and a confusion. between a psychical fact and the moral estimate of that fact. It might be absurd to bring forward the nihilist's non-intention as an extenuation of his crime; but it would hardly be correct to say that he intended the death of other passengers, besides that of the emperor, when he only intended the destruction of the train, though this intention involved an extreme disregard of the various consequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly exposed the passengers to great danger; but if we speak of an intention on his part to expose them to such a danger, we regard this exposure as an act by itself.

A moral judgment may refer to a mere intention, independently of its being realised or not. Moreover, the moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention. In this point moralists of all schools seem to agree. Even Stuart Mill, who drew so sharp a distinction between the morality of the act and the moral worth of the agent, admits that "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention." 3 The event is of moral importance only in so far as it indicates a decision which is final. From the moral point of view there may be a considerable difference between a resolution to do a certain thing in a distant future and a resolution to do it immediately. However determined a person may be to commit a crime, or to perform a good deed, the idea of the immediacy of the event may, in the last moment, induce him to change his mind. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." External events are generally the direct causes of our moral emotions; indeed, without the doing of harm and the doing of good, the moral consciousness would never

1 Sidgwick, of. cit. p. 202, n. I. On the subject of "indirect intention," cf. also Bentham, op. cit. pp. 84, 86.

2 Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 2OI.

3 Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 27 note. Cf. James Mill, Fragment on Mackintosh, p. 376.

have come into existence. Hence the ineradicable tendency to pass moral judgments upon acts, even though they really relate to the final intentions involved in acts. It would be both inconvenient and useless to deviate, in this respect, from the established application of terms. And no misunderstanding can arise from such application if it be borne in mind that by an "act," as the subject of a moral judgment, is invariably understood the event plus the intention which produced it, and that the very same moral judgment as is passed on acts would also, on due reflection, be recognised as valid with reference to final decisions in cases where accidental circumstances prevented the accomplishment of the act.

It is in their capacity of volitions that intentions are subjects of moral judgments. What is perfectly independent of the will is no proper object of moral blame or moral praise. On the other hand, any volition may have a moral value. But, so far as I can see, there are volitions which are not intentions. A person is morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, and the reason for this is that a deliberate wish is a volition. I am aware that, by calling deliberate wishes "volitions," I offend against the terminology generally adopted by psychologists. However, a deliberate wish is not only from a moral point of view as being a proper subject of moral valuation-but psychologically as well, so closely akin to a decision, that there must be a common term comprising both. In the realm of conations, deliberate wishes and decisions form together a province by themselves. In contradistinction to mere conative impulses, they are expressions of a person's character, of his will. A deliberate wish may just as well as a decision represent his "true self." has been argued that a person may will one thing and yet wish the opposite thing. Locke observes:-"A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail upon him. In this case it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that

It

1

tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. Yet in this case I either do not intend to persuade the man, but only to discharge my office by speaking to him words which are apt to have a persuasive effect on him; or, if I do intend to persuade him, I do not in the same moment feel any deliberate wish to the contrary, although I may feel such a wish before or afterwards. We cannot simultaneously have an intention to do a thing and a deliberate wish not to do it.

If it is admitted that moral judgments are passed on acts simply in virtue of their volitional character, it seems impossible to deny that such judgments may be passed on the motives of acts as well. By "motive " I understand a conation which "moves" the will, in other words, the conative cause of a volition.2 The motive itself may be, or may not be, a volition. If it is, it obviously falls within the sphere of moral valuation. The motive of an act may even be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act. When Brutus helped to kill Cæsar in order to save his country, his intention to save his country was the cause, and therefore the motive, of his intention to kill Cæsar. The fact that an intention frequently acts as a motive has led some writers to the conclusion that the motive of an act is a part of the intention. But if the intention of an act is part of the act itself, and a motive is the cause of an intention, the motive of an intention cannot be a part of that intention, since a part cannot be the cause of the whole of which it forms a part.

But even motives which, being neither deliberate wishes

1 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, ii. 21. 30 (Philosophical Works, p. 219).

says Pro

2 "The term 'motive,' fessor Stout (Groundwork of Psychology, p. 233 sq.), "is ambiguous. It may refer to the various conations which come into play in the process of deliberation and tend to influence its result. Or it may refer to the conations which we mentally assign as the

ground or reason of our decision when it has been fully formed." Motive, in the former sense of the term, is not implied in what I here understand by motive. On the other hand, it should be observed that there are motives not only for decisions, but for deliberate wishes-another circumstance which shows the affinity between these two classes of mental facts.

T

nor intentions, consist of non-volitional conations, therefore, are no proper subjects of moral valuation, nevertheless indirectly exercise much influence on mora judgments. Suppose that a person without permis gratifies his hunger with food which is not his own. motive of his act is a non-volitional conation, an appet and has consequently no moral value. Yet it mus taken into account by him who judges upon the act. Ot things being equal, the person in question is less guilt proportion as his hunger is more intense. The m judgment is modified by the pressure which the volitional motive exercises upon the agent's will. T same is the case when the motive of an act is the cont element involved in an emotion. If a person commits certain crime under the influence of anger, he is: so blamable as if he commits the same crime in c blood. Thus, also, it is more meritorious to be kind to a enemy from a feeling of duty, than to be kind to a frie from a feeling of love. No man deserves blame or pr for the pressure of a non-volitional conation unless, indeed, such a pressure is due to choice, or un it might have been avoided with due foresight. But person may deserve blame or praise for not resisting th impulse, or for allowing it to influence his will for evil good.

upon

his will

and

It is true that moral judgments are commonly pass on acts without much regard being paid to their motives: but the reason for this is only the superficiality of ordin moral estimates. Moral indignation and moral approva are, in the first place, aroused by conspicuous facts, whilst the intention of an act is expressed in the act itse its motive is not. But a conscientious judge cannot, like the multitude, be conter hjudging of the surface only ment that "the motive has y of the action, thoug "2 has drawn a disting

Stuart Mill, in his f

nothing to do w much with the wort