on force, and in Greece, for the first time, we meet with the opinion that the institution of slavery is contrary to Nature, and that it is the law which, unjustly, makes one man a slave and another free.1 However, Aristotle was no doubt in general agreement with his age when he declared that the barbarians, on account of their inferiority, are intended by Nature to be the slaves of the Greeks.2 3 The Roman jurists held up slavery as a mitigation of the horrors of war: the capture and preservation of enemies, they said, was its sole and exclusive origin in the past. But in Rome as elsewhere, when once established, it contained in itself the germ of extension; all the children of a female slave followed the condition of the mother, according to the principle applicable to the offspring of the lower animals-" Partus sequitur ventrem." And sooner or later, when these sources proved insufficient to maintain the supply, a regular commerce in slaves was established, which was based on the systematically prosecuted hunting of men in foreign lands. To a much smaller extent the slave class was recruited by Roman citizens-by children sold by their fathers, by insolvent debtors, or by criminals condemned to servitude as a punishment for some heinous offence. The idea of a Roman becoming the slave of a fellow-citizen was never quite agreeable to the Roman mind. According to an ancient law the debtor, after being made over to the creditor, should be sold abroad or trans Tiberim.® Subsequently, in 326 B.C., the creditor's lien was restricted to the goods of his debtor, if the latter was a Roman citizen; and during the Pagan Empire the sale of free 1 Idem, Politica, i. 3, p. 1253 b. 2 Ibid. i. 2, 6, pp. 1252 b, 1255 a. See Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulide, 1400 sq. 3 Hunter, Exposition of Roman Law, p. 160 sq. Institutiones, i. 3. 3:"Slaves are called servi, because generals are wont to sell their captives, and so to preserve (servare), and not to destroy them. They are also called mancipia, because they are taken from the enemy with the strong hand (manu capiuntur)." Mommsen, History of Rome, iii. 305 sq. Wallon, op. cit. ii. 46 sqq. Ingram, op. cit. p. 38. Wallon, op. cit. ii. 18 sqq. Ingram, op. cit. p. 39. Institutiones, i. 12. 3. 6 Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law, p. 94. 7 Livy, Historiæ Romanæ, viii. 28. Wallon, op. cit. ii. 29, n. I. born children by their fathers was prohibited.1 The power, originally unlimited, which the master had over his slave was also, in the course of time, subjected to limitations. We have seen that since the days of Claudius and Antoninus Pius legal check was put on the master's right of killing his slave. The Lex Petronia, A.D. 61, forbade masters to compel their slaves to fight with wild beasts.3 In the time of Nero an official was appointed to hear complaints of the wrongs done by masters to their slaves. Antoninus Pius directed that slaves treated with excessive cruelty, who had taken refuge at an altar or imperial image, should be sold; and this provision was extended to cases in which the master had employed a slave in a way degrading to him or beneath his character." In public auctions of slaves regard was paid to the claims of relationship, and in the interpretation of testaments it was assumed that members of the same family were not to be separated by the division of the succession. In those days when Roman slavery had lost its original patriarchal and, to speak with Mommsen, "in some measure innocent" character, when the victories of Rome and the increasing slave trade had introduced into the city innumerable slaves, when those simpler habits of life which in early times somewhat mitigated the rigour of the law had changed-the lot of the Roman slave was often extremely hard, and numerous acts of shocking cruelty were committed." But we also hear, from the early days of the Empire, that masters who had been cruel to their slaves were pointed at with disgust in all parts of the city, and were hated and loathed.10 And with a fervour which can hardly be surpassed Seneca and other Stoics argued that the slave is a being with human dignity and human rights, born of the same race as ourselves, living the same life, 8 7 Wallon, op. cit. iii. 53. 305. See Lecky, History of European Morals, i. 302 sq. 10 Seneca, De clementia, i. 18. 3. and dying the same death-in short, that our slaves “are also men, and friends, and our fellow-servants." Epictetus even went so far as to condemn altogether the keeping of slaves, a radicalism explicable from the history of his own life. "What you avoid suffering yourself," he says, "seek not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for instance; take care not to enslave. For if you can bear to exact slavery from others, you appear to have been yourself a slave." These teachings could not fail to influence both legislation and public sentiment. Imbued with the Stoic philosophy, the jurists of the classical period declared that all men are originally free by the law of Nature, and that slavery is only "an institution of the Law of Nations, by which one man is made the property of another, in opposition to natural right."3 Considering that Christianity has commonly been represented as almost the sole cause of the mitigation and final abolishment of slavery in Europe, it deserves special notice that the chief improvement in the condition of slaves at Rome took place at so early a period that Christianity could have absolutely no share in it. Nay, for about two hundred years after it was made the official religion of the Empire there was an almost complete pause in the legislation on the subject. Under Justinian certain reforms were introduced:-enfranchisement was facilitated in various ways; the rights of Roman citizens were granted to emancipated slaves, who had previously occupied an intermediate position between slavery and perfect freedom; and though the law still refused to recognise the marriages of slaves, Justinian gave them a legal value after emancipation in establishing rights of succession.7 But the inferior position of the slave was asserted as sternly as ever. He belonged to the 1 Idem, Epistolæ, 47. Idem, De beneficiis, iii. 28. Epictetus, Dissertationes, i. 13. See also the collection of statements referring to slavery made by Holland, Reign of the Stoics, p. 186 sqq. 2 Epictetus, Fragmenta, 42. 3 Institutiones, i. 3. 2. 4 Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, ii. 64. 5 Institutiones, i. 5 sqq. corporeal" property of his master, he was reckoned among things which are tangible by their nature, like land, raiment, gold, and silver.1 The constitution of Antoninus Pius restraining excessive severity on the part of masters was enforced, but the motive for this was not evangelic humanity. It is said in the Institutes of Justinian, "This decision is a just one; for it greatly concerns the public weal, that no one be permitted to misuse even his own property.' "3 It is curious to note that the inconsistency of slavery with the tenet, "Do to others as you would be done by,' though emphasised by a pagan philosopher, never seems to have occurred to any of the early Christian writers. Christianity recognised slavery from the beginning. The principle that all men are spiritually equal in Christ does not imply that they should be socially equal in the world. Slavery does not prevent anybody from performing the duties incumbent on a Christian, it does not bar the way to heaven, it is an external affair only, nothing but a name. He only is really a slave who commits sin.* Slavery is of course a burden, but a burden which has been laid upon the back of transgression. Man when created by God was free, and nobody was the slave of another until that just man Noah cursed Ham, his offending son; slavery, then, is a punishment sent by Him who best knows how to proportionate punishment to offence. The slave himself ought not to desire to become free, nay, if the master offers him freedom he ought not to accept it. Not one of the Fathers even 6 1 Institutiones, ii. 2. 1. 2 Cf. Milman, History of Latin Christianity, ii. 14. 3 Institutiones, i. 8. 2. Gregory Nazianzen, Orationes, xiv. 25 (Migne, Patrologie cursus, Ser. Graeca, xxxv. 891 sq.). Idem, Carmina, i. 2. 26. 29 (ibid. xxxvii. 853); i. 2. 33. 133 sqq. (ibid. xxxvii. 937 sq.). St. Chrysostom, In cap. IX. Genes. Homilia XXIX. 7 (ibid. liii. 270). Idem, In Epist. I. ad Cor. Homilia XIX. 5 (ibid. lxi. 158). St. Ambrose, In Epistolam ad Colossenses, 3 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Lat. xvii. 439). 5 St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, xix. 15 (Migne, op. cit. xli. 643 sq.). 6 St. Ignatius, Epistola ad Polycarpum, 4 (Migne, op. cit. Ser. Graeca, v. 723 sq.). St. Augustine, Ennaratio in Psalmum CXXIV. 7 (Migne, op. cit. xxxvii. 1653). 7 Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanité, iv. 117. hints that slavery is unlawful or improper.1 In the early 8 The Apostles reminded slaves of their duties towards their masters and masters of their duties towards their slaves. The same was done by Councils and Popes. The Council of Gangra, about the year 324, pronounced its anathema on anyone who should teach a slave to despise his master on pretence of religion; and so much importance was attached to this decree that it was inserted in the epitome of canons which Hadrian I. in 773 presented to Charlemagne in Rome. But there are also many instances in which masters are recommended to show humanity to their slaves.10 According to Gregory IX. 1 Cf. Babington, Influence of Christianity in Promoting the Abolition of Slavery in Europe, p. 29. 2 Ibid. p. 22. Potgiesser, Commentarii juris Germanici de statu servorum, i. 4. 8, p. 176. Muratori, Dissertazioni sopra le antichità italiane, i. 244. 3 Concilium Toletanum IV. A.D. 633, can. 66 (Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio, x. 635). Blakey, Temporal Benefits of Christianity, p. 397. Digby, Mores Catholici, ii. 341. Cibrario, Della schiavitù e del servaggio, i. 272. Rivière, L'Église et l'esclavage, p. 350. 4 Concilium Aurelianense IV. about A. D. 545, can. 32 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ix. 118 sq.). 5 Concilium Rhemense, about A.D. 630, can. 22 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. x. 597). Gratian, Decretum, ii. 12. 2. 6 Bouvier, Institutiones philosophica, 7 Ephesians, vi. 5 sqq. Colossians, iii. 22 sqq.; iv. I. 8 Concilium Gangrense, about A.D. 324, can. 3 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. ii. 1102, 1106, 1110). |