is due for the kind reception I invariably received from peasants and mountaineers, not generally noted for friendliness towards Europeans.

I beg to express my best thanks to Mr. Stephen Gwynn for revising the first thirteen chapters, and to Mr. H. C. Minchin for revising the remaining portion of the book. To their suggestions I am indebted for the improvement of many phrases and expressions. I have likewise to thank my friend Mr. Alex. F. Shand for kindly reading the proofs of the earlier chapters and giving me the benefit of his opinion.

Throughout the work the reader will easily find how much I owe to British science and thought a debt which is greater than I can ever express.

LONDON,

January, 1906.

E. W.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE present edition is only a reprint of the first, with a few inaccurate expressions corrected.

LONDON,

E. W.

July, 1912.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

The origin of the present investigation, p. 1.-Its subject-matter, p. 1 sq.-Its
practical usefulness, p. 2 sq.

66

CHAPTER I

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

or

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena

to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.-The assumed universality or 'ob-

jectivity" of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.-Theories according to which the

moral predicates derive all their import from reason, "theoretical"

practical," p. 7 sq.-Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments no

sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.—This

tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral con-

sciousness, p. 9.-Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances

of a purely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.-Differences of an emotional

origin, pp. 11-13.-Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. 13.—

The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority

ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.—The origin and nature of this authority,

pp. 14-17.-General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.-The object of

scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral

consciousness as a fact, p. 18.-The supposed dangers of ethical subjectiv-

ism, pp. 18-20.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds : disapproval, or indignation, and approval,

p. 21. The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a sub-

species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly

emotion, ibid.-Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind toward a cause

of pain, p. 22 sq.-Dr. Steinmetz's suggestion that revenge is essentially

rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally "undirected,"

pp. 23-27.-The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this

hypothesis, pp. 27-30.-The collective responsibility usually involved in the

institution of the blood-feud, pp. 30-32.-Explanation of it, pp. 32-35.—