121 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting in part. The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an appropriate judgment based on the maximum ceiling price of the pepper at the time it was taken. It is so ordered. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting in part. In 1933 Commodities Trading Corporation began to accumulate an inventory of black pepper, not as a trader in pepper but as an investor in a nonperishable commodity. It based this investment policy on the fairly regular cyclical fluctuations of pepper prices over a period of about seventy-five years. This regularity was due to the fact that pepper plantings in Sumatra, French IndoChina and India, which supplied almost all of it, fluctuated with the price of pepper in the world market. Neglect of their crops by the native growers in periods of depressed prices lowered supply; thereby prices were raised and this in turn stimulated new plantings. Since it takes the pepper plant about four years to bear, prices would normally maintain their high level for about that period. The operations of Commodities were based on the expectation that it would profitably adjust the sale of its holdings to the cyclical movement. By 1938 Commodities had accumulated 25,000,000 pounds; by December, 1941, it had disposed of about 8,000,000 pounds. The rest it withheld from the market until the requisition here in controversy was made by the War Department, in May, 1944. December, 1941, is a significant date because a ceiling price on pepper was then established. The price at which it was pegged6.75 cents per pound, amended shortly thereafter to 6.50 cents plus limited carrying charges-approximated the FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting in part. 339 U.S. market price at the time the free market in pepper came to an end. This free market price was responsive to the then unusually large inventory of pepper in the country, amounting to from 78,000,000 to 100,000,000 pounds, a three-year supply. The Government forbade importation of high-priced pepper from India, and the other sources of supply were cut off by the Japanese invasion. As a result, stocks rapidly declined, the fall being accelerated after the imposition of ceiling prices by a desire on the part of many importers to avoid additional carrying charges. By September, 1943, only about 28,000,000 pounds were in the hands of importers. Of this Commodities held, as we have seen, 17,000,000. From about the middle of 1942 activity had steadily shrunk and by early 1944 pepper was not for sale. In May, 1944, the War Department requisitioned from Commodities about 760,000 pounds of black pepper. Commodities rejected the Government's offer of compensation at the ceiling price and this suit to recover “just compensation" followed. On the basis of its "special findings of fact" the Court of Claims held that the ceiling price was not the measure of just compensation for the requisitioned pepper. It deemed the right to withhold from sale nonperishable goods until after price control terminated a value of substance to be included in ascertaining just compensation. The inclusion of this "retention value" in the present circumstances was especially appropriate, so the Court of Claims reasoned, because Commodities was not a trader but a long-term investor. After the controls were removed in 1946, pepper sold at 50 to 60 cents a pound and upward and the Court of Claims deemed these free market values relevant in determining the just compensation for the pepper requisitioned in 1944. In giving an award above the ceiling price, that court was further influenced by the fact that the cost of the pepper it attributed to 121 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting in part. Commodities-12.7 cents per pound-exceeded the ceiling. Taking all the factors it deemed relevant into account, 15 cents per pound was found by that court to be just compensation for the pepper taking. I. The "just compensation" required by the Bill of Rights when "private property [is] taken for public use" has a way of attracting far-flung contentions. So here, extreme positions are taken regarding the relevance of ceiling prices to "just compensation." On the one hand. it is urged that ceiling prices are to be treated as though they represent value determined by a free market. On the other hand it is insisted that since it would be unjust for the Government itself to fix the compensation for what it takes, ceiling prices should be ignored. I agree with what I understand to be the Court's view in rejecting both these absolutes. War conditions drastically change the economic environment in which a free market has its justification. The purpose of government controls is to terminate such a distorted free market. Since ceiling prices are required by law to be "generally fair and equitable"1 and govern voluntary sales of property, they are not irrelevant in assessing just compensation. The value of private property is not immutable; especially is it not immune from the consequences of governmental policies. In the exercise of its constitutional powers, Congress by general enactments may in diverse ways cause even appreciable pecuniary loss without compensation. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. . . . When [the diminution] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain 1 Emergency Price Control Act § 2 (a), 56 Stat. 24, 50 U. S. C. App. § 902 (a). FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting in part. 339 U.S. and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413. See also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355; Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 561; Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31. It does not follow that controlled prices automatically meet the requirements for just compensation in the forcible taking of property simply because they replaced free market prices which could no longer be relied on to reflect the normal play of free economic forces. A system of price controls which is "generally fair and equitable" may give rise to individual instances of hardship in the requisitioning of property no matter how conscientiously and competently administered. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 516-18. The hardship may reach such magnitude in an individual instance as to make a taking by the public at a ceiling price unjust compensation. Of course war means burdens, and there is no calculus by which they can be fairly distributed. From any point of view the ultimate sacrifices are uncompensable. But these considerations are not relevant in carrying out the Fifth Amendment. When there is a taking of property for public use, whether in war or in peace, the burden of the taking is the community's burden. The owner should be requited by that which satisfies prevailing standards of justice. This limitation upon the power of eminent domain has throughout our history been left for judicial application. We would be faced with a new problem had Congress specified that the ceiling prices should be the limit of just compensation. Such a statute would call for the usual respect to be accorded to the judgment of Congress in passing on the validity of legislation when the power of Congress to legislate is limited by broad standards and not by restrictions almost technical in their nature. We are relieved from a considera 121 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting in part. tion of any such question because Congress chose not to make ceiling price the measure of "just compensation." It is therefore an inescapable judicial duty to explore the elements relevant to just compensation even for the taking of property which, as to voluntary transactions, is subject to price control. The standard of just compensation is not mechanically to be replaced by ceiling prices. It takes us some distance neither wholly to accept nor wholly to reject price ceilings as just compensation. The complications introduced by the displacement of free market prices by controlled prices serve to intensify the usual wariness against undue generalizations in ascertaining the value of specific property taken for public purposes. Cautious empiricism is the most promising attitude in dealing with problems of this sort. This means hugging as closely as possible the shore of the circumstances of the particular case. On the present record only two issues need to be faced. In arriving at just compensation did the Court of Claims properly take into account (1) a "retention value" and (2) the cost of the pepper to Commodities. II. The Court of Claims appears to have recognized as a component of just compensation the right of a property owner to withhold his property for some future opportunity of enhanced realization, even though he be in the same boat with all other owners for whom the ceiling price is a fair measure. In its bearing upon our immediate problem, recognition of such a "retention value" as part of the contemporaneous value of what was taken would have required the power to "divine prophetically" the war's end and the lifting of controls by Congress as well as the state of the pepper market thereafter. This is "to exact gifts that mankind does not possess." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 223, 224. To allow such wild imagination to enter into the practical determination of what is just |