to be lightly assumed that the silence of the statute bars from the courts an otherwise justiciable issue." 14

Nor did Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, determine the present jurisdictional issue. In a federal bankruptcy court handling a railroad reorganization, an interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement was sought. We declared that the federal equity court should "exercise equitable discretion to give [the National Railroad Adjustment Board] the first opportunity to pass on the issue." 15 Thus we determined only that under the circumstances of that case the District Court, as a matter of discretion, should have remanded to the Board a controversy over the meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement, and at the same time should have retained jurisdiction to apply the Board's interpretation to the controversy. There was no intimation that the obligation to send the controversy to the Board was any more universal than the obligation of an equity court to sometimes remit parties to the state courts for a preliminary decision on state law.18 There was no ruling that Congress had deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. Today the Court is compelled to extend the Pitney precedent from "discretion" to "jurisdiction" because federal courts lack power to order state courts to exercise in a particular manner their equitable discretion. But the Court's inability to secure a flexible rule does not warrant the Court to impose on the state courts a rigid one.

Congress surely would not have granted this exclusive primary power to adjudicate contracts to a body like the Board. It consists of people chosen and paid, not by the Government, but by groups of carriers and the

14 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309.

15 Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, 567. 16 Ibid.; cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472; Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228.

large national unions." Congress has furnished few procedural safeguards. There is no process for compelling the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence. There is no official record, other than that of the informal pleadings. Hearings are conducted without witnesses.18 The Board has operated without giving individuals a chance to be heard unless they were represented by unions.19

Throughout this opinion I have assumed that the Court means only to impose a requirement of primary recourse to the Board. But that inevitably means many litigants would be deprived of access to the courts. The extent of judicial review of awards other than money awards is doubtful, and it is highly questionable whether even a money award can be reviewed in the courts if only the carrier wishes review.20 Most important, the statute provides no relief for a petitioning party—be he union, individual or carrier-against an erroneous order of the Board.21 This Court may be hard put to protect the rights of minorities under these circumstances.22

Nevertheless the Court says that Congress has forced the parties into a forum that has few of the attributes

17 48 Stat. 1189, § 3 First (a) (b) (c) (g).

18 Monograph, n. 5, supra, pp. 11-14; see Garrison, National Railroad Adjustment Board, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 576 et seq.

19 Monograph, n. 5, supra, p. 7.

20 See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 12, 124 F. 2d 235, 246; affirmed by an equally divided court, 319 U. S. 732.

21 48 Stat. 1191, §3 First (m) and (p). Garrison, National Railroad Adjustment Board, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 591.

22 See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 206. Compare Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695; State ex rel. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. Russell, 358 Mo. 1136, 219 S. W. 2d 340; Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 346, 350, 176 F. 2d 755, 759 et seq. Cf. Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177.

of a court, but which may be the final judge of the rights of individuals. Our duty as a court does not extend to a determination of the wisdom of putting a solution of industry problems into the hands of industry agencies so far as the Constitution will permit.23 Some Some may deem it desirable to weld various industries or professions into self-governing forms, completely free from judicial intervention. This desire may spring from a conviction that experience and training in highly specialized fields give the members of a group that understanding and capacity which will enable them to govern their internal affairs better than would courts dealing with the generality of human relations and only occasionally with these specialized controversies. Congress, however, has never completely so isolated an industry from the rest of the Nation. There is too much interrelation and interdependence between such groups and the rest of the population. In some instances the Congress has given great sweep to agencies in some fields. Even special courts have been created, such as the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. When Congress has created these administrative agencies and special courts, it has carefully outlined their powers, provided stated protections for individual rights, and has furnished neutral officials. But here, although none of these protections have been provided, the Court finds an underlying purpose in Congress to abolish, without discussion, judicial jurisdiction.

When an administrative body varies so markedly from the kind which experience has shown may safely be given final power over people's rights, it should not be assumed that Congress intended the primary jurisdiction of the Board to be exclusive. A more definite expression is required. The decision of the Court places it in a dilemma

23 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276.

of its own creation-it must in the future build up a complex system of review, or it must say that Congress intended to leave the rights of many individuals and organizations to the unreviewable discretion of a privately selected board. By giving effect to the plain words of the statute which confer on the Board a jurisdiction only concurrent with the courts, we should avoid the necessity for judicial legislation in unexplored areas of the law. If unseemly results should follow, the legislative body would have the facilities to undertake the important and extensive task of deciding what should be the proper distribution of authority between courts and administrative bodies in connection with railroad labor relations. Courts should await specific legislative direction instead of reading into a statute a purpose to transfer jurisdiction from state courts to a federal board.

Opinion of the Court.

ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

No. 438. Argued February 8-9, 1950.-Decided April 10, 1950.

A dispute arose between a railroad and a labor union as to the railroad's obligation under their collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services. The railroad refused the demand of the union and commenced a declaratory judgment action in a state court. The union thereafter filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act. Held: The state court was without power to interpret the terms of the agreement and adjudicate the dispute. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 239. Pp. 255-257. 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816, reversed.

In a declaratory judgment action brought by a railroad against a labor union, for adjudication of a dispute arising out of a collective-bargaining agreement between them, a state court interpreted the agreement and entered a declaratory judgment. The State Supreme Court affirmed. 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 899. Reversed and remanded, p. 257.

V. C. Shuttleworth argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Harry E. Wilmarth and Frederick H. Horlbeck.

W. S. Macgill argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nath B. Barnwell, Frank G. Tompkins, Henry L. Walker and Sidney S. Alderman.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises the same statutory question as Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 239. The petitioner, Order of Railway Conductors, is the only accredited bargaining representative of conductors employed by the re

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