497 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. ernment departments, acting under legal advice, that a concession as to a statute's applicability was an expedient step in the war production program is to disregard the justification for utilizing "administrative interpretation" as a gloss on ambiguous legislation. The Government exerted close supervision over every phase of operations at these ordnance plants, specifying articles to be manufactured, production quotas and methods of production. Government control was particularly dominant with respect to personnel policies, including phases of hiring and firing, job assignments, working conditions, wage rates, and overtime compensation. The investment in plant and facilities was entirely the Government's, and the Government bore all the expenditures and all the risks of operation. As between the contractors and the workers, the operation was wanting in the characteristic aspects of the normal employer-employee relation. In view of these factors and the applicability of the Walsh-Healey Act with its protective features for plant personnel, I see no basis for attributing to Congress the intention to make these contractors "employers" within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act when such a result would have fiscal consequences neither foreseen nor, on any reasonable assumption, desired by Congress. Cf. United States v. Wittek, 337 U. S. 346. Since the United States is not an "employer" within the meaning of the statute, the overtime provisions are inapplicable. These considerations call for affirmance without discussion of other grounds which have been advanced for sustaining the judgments below, some of which at least have commended themselves to several Courts of Appeals. BUS. BUILDING SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNTON, LOCAL 202, ET AL. T. GAZZAM. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME OCURT OF WASHINGTON. No 449. Arpet Fenrury 9. 2950-Deeded May 8, 1960. In a state whose pubor poùry as that employers shall not coerce ther employees' chore of a bargaining representative, a state court sportot against peaceful porketing by a labor mom for the parmar purpose of compelling an empicker to sign a contrast which would everne bis employees' choice of a barERDINE representative does not violate the night of free speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution Pp 58-541. (a) Since pickering as more than speech and establishes a locus In quo that has far more potential for indoring arbon than the message the pockets convey, this Court upholds a state's restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to porket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful pubbesty. Pp 536-537. (b) The picketing of the employer to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining representative was unlawful because it was an attempt to induce a transgression of the State's policy against such coercion of employees. Pp. 538-539. (e) American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, distinguished: Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, followed. Pp. 539-540. 34 Wash 2d 38. 207 P. 2d 699, affirmed. Petitioners were enjoined by a state court from picketing respondent's place of business. The State Supreme Court affirmed. 34 Wash. 2d 38, 207 P. 2d 699. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 903. Affirmed, p. 541. Daniel D. Carmell and Walter F. Dodd argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Alfred J. Schweppe argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. 532 Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. It is the public policy of the State of Washington that employers shall not coerce their employees' choice of representatives for purposes of collective bargaining. Do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution permit the State, in reliance on this policy, to enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for the purpose of compelling an employer to sign a contract with a labor union which coerces his employees' choice of bargaining representative? The State answered in the affirmative. An injunction was issued in narrow terms enjoining petitioners "from endeavoring to compel plaintiff to coerce his employees to join the defendant union or to designate defendant union as their representative for collective bargaining, by picketing the hotel premises of plaintiff . . . . The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, 34 Wash. 2d 38, 207 P. 2d 699, and we granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 903. At the time of the controversy, respondent employed about fifteen persons at Enetai Inn, a small hotel which he operates in Bremerton, Washington. Just prior to May 1, 1946, representatives of the petitioner union called upon respondent about organizing his employees and asked him to sign a contract with the union which would require his employees to join the union. None of the employees was a member of any union active in the area. Respondent replied that that was a matter for the employees to decide. He gave the union and its representatives permission freely to visit and solicit his employees for membership while he was absent on a brief trip to Los Angeles. Upon his return, the union representatives again approached him about signing a contract. The representatives admitted that they had not Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. The State of Washington has what is sometimes referred to as a "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,"1 which provides that no injunction shall issue in a "labor dispute,” as defined in the Act, except in conformity with the provisions of the Act; nor shall any injunction issue contrary to the public policy declared in the Act. No "labor dispute" as determined by the law of Washington was held to exist in this case. There was no injunction. against picketing generally. It was held that the objective of the picketing was violative of the public policy against employer coercion of employees' choice of bargaining representative, and that the picketing should be enjoined on that narrow ground.2 Does the injunction, limited as it is to restraining petitioners from picketing respondent's hotel for the purpose of compelling him to coerce his employees' choice of bargaining representative, constitute an abridgment of the right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? This Court has said that picketing is in part an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Con 1 Washington Labor Disputes Act, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 7612. Certain sections of this Act were held unconstitutional by the Washington Court in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Company, 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. 2d 397. 2 The Washington Supreme Court reviewed its decisions in this field in its first opinion in the instant case. O'Neil v. Building Service Employees Union, 9 Wash. 2d 507, 115 P. 2d 662, and S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 P. 2d 962, had treated any peaceful picketing as lawful. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, was held to be controlling in both cases. But in the instant case, both the O'Neil and S&W cases were characterized as wrong in principle and were expressly overruled. The court quoted from Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 177 P. 2d 873, 880, where it was said that peaceful picketing is an exercise of the right of free speech which loses the protection of constitutional guaranty where "it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion." 532 Opinion of the Court. stitution. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468. But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey, this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity. Thus in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, the picketing in issue, considered in isolation, was peaceful, but had been found to be enmeshed with and set in such a background of violence that it was a part of a pattern of violence. This Court held that peaceful picketing under such circumstances might properly be enjoined by the State. In Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin E. R. B., 315 U. S. 437, this Court upheld the right of Wisconsin through its Employment Relations Board to issue a cease and desist order against violence in picketing and boycotting by the union involved. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, upheld a decree enjoining the union from picketing a cafe having no business connection with the place where the industrial dispute centered. And in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, the Court sustained a decree enjoining picketing which was peaceful and informative but was carried on for the purpose of coercing the employer to violate the antitrust law of Missouri. The public policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts. "Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine |