56 Opinion of the Court. that respondent was conducting his business illegally. The search was for stamps overprinted illegally, which were thought upon the most reliable information to be in the possession of and concealed by respondent in the very room where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate control and in which he had been selling such stamps unlawfully. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, which has not been overruled, is ample authority for the more limited search here considered. In all the years of our Nation's existence, with special attention to the Prohibition Era, it seems never to have been questioned seriously that a limited search such as here conducted as incident to a lawful arrest was a reasonable search and therefore valid. It has been considered in the same pattern as search of the person after lawful arrest. What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what are "unreasonable" searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357. Reasonableness is in the first instance for the District Court to determine. We think the District Court's conclusion 5 When construing state safeguards similar to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, state courts have shown little hesitancy in holding that incident to a lawful arrest upon premises within the control of the arrested person, a search of the premises at least to the extent conducted in the instant case is not unreasonable. See, e. g.: Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 P. 372; Italiano v. State, 141 Fla. 249, 193 So. 48; State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 89 P. 2d 197; State v. Carenza, 357 Mo. 1172, 212 S. W. 2d 743; State ex rel. Wong You v. District Court, 106 Mont. 347, 78 P. 2d 353; Davis v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 61, 234 P. 787; State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court, 29 Wash. 2d 601, 188 P. 2d 125; State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77, 136 S. E. 703. 874433 0-50-9 Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. that here the search and seizure were reasonable should be sustained because: (1) the search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of the search was a business room to which the public, including the officers, was invited; (3) the room was small and under the immediate and complete control of respondent; (4) the search did not extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered stamps was a crime, just as it is a crime to possess burglars' tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit money. Assuming that the officers had time to procure a search warrant, were they bound to do so? We think not, because the search was otherwise reasonable, as previously concluded. In a recent opinion, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, this Court first enunciated the requirement that search warrants must be procured when "practicable" in a case of search incident to arrest. On the occasion of the previous suggestion of such a test, Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, the Court had been scrupulous to restrict the opinion to the familiar situation there presented. Prohibition agents, having received complaints for about a year, went at 2:30 a. m. to a garage adjacent to a house, flashed a light through a small opening, and then broke in and seized liquor. The Court emphasized that "No one was within the place and there was no reason to think otherwise." Id. at 5. Lest the holding that such a search of an unoccupied building в There is no dispute that the objects searched for and seized here, having been utilized in perpetrating a crime for which arrest was made, were properly subject to seizure. Such objects are to be distinguished from merely evidentiary materials which may not be taken into custody. United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, at 464-66; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 309-11. This is a distinction of importance, for "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself . . . ." United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911, 914. 56 Opinion of the Court. was unreasonable be thought to have broader significance the Court carefully stated in conclusion: "This record does not make it necessary for us to discuss the rule in respect of searches in connection with an arrest. No offender was in the garage; the action of the agents had no immediate connection with an arrest. The purpose was to secure evidence to support some future arrest." Id. at 6. A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search. It is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant. Whether there was time may well be dependent upon considerations other than the ticking off of minutes or hours. The judgment of the officers as to when to close the trap on a criminal committing a crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to believe is committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there was time to procure a search warrant. Some flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential. It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches. It is not disputed that there may be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest, without a search warrant. Upon acceptance of this established rule that some authority to search follows from lawfully taking the person into custody, it becomes apparent that such searches turn upon the BLACK, J., dissenting. 339 U.S. reasonableness under all the circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not required. To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, requires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstancesthe total atmosphere of the case. It is a sufficient precaution that law officers must justify their conduct before courts which have always been, and must be, jealous of the individual's right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment. We do not treat additional questions raised by respondent in his brief to support the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We consider it appropriate to dispose of these issues on the basis of the excellent discussion below. The motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied by the District Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, was decided on the unarticulated premise that the Fourth Amendment of itself barred the use of evidence obtained by what the Court considered an "unreasonable" search. I dissented in that case. Later, concurring in this Court's decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39-40, I stated my agreement with the "plain implication" of the Wolf opinion that "the federal exclusionary rule is not a com 56 BLACK, J., dissenting. mand of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate." In the light of the Wolf case, the Trupiano rule is not a constitutional command, but rather an evidentiary policy adopted by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over federal courts. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. The present case comes within that rule: the trial court admitted certain evidence procured by a search and seizure without a search warrant although the officers had ample time and opportunity to get one. Whether this Court should adhere to the Trupiano principle making evidence so obtained inadmissible in federal courts now presents no more than a question of what is wise judicial policy. Although the rule does not in all respects conform to my own ideas, I think that the reasons for changing it are outweighed by reasons against its change. In recent years, the scope of the rule has been a subject of almost constant judicial controversy both in trial and appellate courts. In no other field has the law's uncertainty been more clearly manifested. To some extent that uncertainty may be unavoidable. The Trupiano case itself added new confusions "in a field already replete with complexities." Trupiano v. United States, supra, 716. But overruling that decision merely aggravates existing uncertainty. For as MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER points out, today's holding casts doubt on other cases recently decided. And I do not understand how trial judges can be expected to foresee what further shifts may occur. In my judgment it would be wiser judicial policy to adhere to the Trupiano rule of evidence, at least long enough to see how it works. That rule is based upon very strict requirements designed to narrow the occasions upon which officers can make searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Unquestionably its application will now and then permit |