The Strategic ConstitutionPrinceton University Press, 30 มิ.ย. 2020 - 440 หน้า Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 48
... Coalition Unstable Coalitions Coalitions in Two-Party Systems The Game of State Conclusion CHAPTER 4. Administering Parables of Administration Delegation Game SOLUTION GRAPH EXAMPLE SIGNIFICANCE OF DELEGATION GAME BENEFITS OF ...
... Coalition Formation Connected Coalitions Winning v. Connected Coalitions Delegation Game Principal's Payoff from Delegating Administrative Cost-Diversion Trade-off Rule Game Principal's Payoff from Giving Discretion to Agent Flexibility ...
... Coalitions (1962) took a somewhat different approach to elections by emphasizing coalitions among parties. Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965) analyzed the influence of money on ...
... coalition in a parliamentary system and the principles that govern lobbying. Chapter 4 uses the principal–agent relationship to analyze civil service bureaucracies, especially the trade-off among delegation of power, rules, and the ...
คุณถึงขีดจำกัดการดูหนังสือเล่มนี้แล้ว.
เนื้อหา
2 | |
15 | |
26 | |
Agenda | 44 |
Bargaining | 51 |
Tax on Beverages | 69 |
Government by Coalition | 73 |
Administering | 79 |
Bargaining among Executive and Two Houses | 217 |
Bargaining between Houses of Legislature | 223 |
Conference Committees Discretion | 224 |
Civil Rights Legislation and Bush Administration | 230 |
An Example | 234 |
Procedure Changes Power in European Union | 238 |
OPTIMAL RIGHTS | 241 |
Liberty as a Commodity | 247 |
Delegation Game | 82 |
Politics Civil Service and Courts | 96 |
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS | 101 |
Intergovernmental Relations | 103 |
Optimal Number of Governments | 104 |
Internalization Prescription for Government Jurisdiction | 107 |
Tied Grant | 117 |
Comprehensive or SinglePurpose Government? Horizontal Divisions | 120 |
Voters Net Benefits | 122 |
Government Competition | 127 |
Direct and Indirect Democracy | 143 |
Ministries and Agencies | 149 |
Agency Size | 152 |
Agencys Production Possibilities | 168 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS | 171 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS 17 l | 173 |
Bicameralism Protects Majority against Minority | 187 |
Executive | 189 |
Judiciary | 195 |
Judicial Preferences | 201 |
Oil Field with Wells | 206 |
Conclusion | 209 |
Liberty as Welfare | 253 |
Liberty and Redistribution | 261 |
Income Taxation and Redistribution | 262 |
Hierarchy of Desires | 270 |
State of Nature | 274 |
Property Rights | 279 |
Demand for state Restrictions by State Officials | 293 |
Value of Alternative Acts in Nollan | 300 |
Transferable Development Rights | 304 |
Free Speech | 309 |
Organizations Restricting Members Speech | 321 |
Conclusion | 331 |
Civil Rights | 333 |
Discriminatory Employees | 342 |
White Flight | 353 |
Summary and Conclusion | 359 |
Factoring Splicing and the Character of Politics | 361 |
Conclusion | 374 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 381 |
GENERAL INDEX | 399 |
Index of Names | 409 |