The Strategic ConstitutionPrinceton University Press, 30 มิ.ย. 2020 - 440 หน้า Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. |
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... person who takes consequences seriously, constitutional theorists look too hard for the right words and not hard enough for the real causes." Constitutional theory needs more models and less meaning. After preaching his Sunday sermon in ...
... person should decide what to do by anticipating how others will respond. For this reason, political competition is strategic. Economics "North makes the point concisely: “A state is an organization with a comparative advantage in ...
... person to affect the price, so price theory usually assumes that actors behave nonstrategically. In contrast, game theory analyzes strategic behavior, which typically involves small numbers of competitors.” Just as perfectly competitive ...
... person knows his own wants better than others do. Consequently, individuals satisfy their preferences best when given freedom to choose. For these reasons, a constitution that aims to satisfy the preferences of individuals must give ...
... person decides to participate in a vote and I will analyze how that person will vote. Second I will analyze how a rational citizen will decide whether to bother participating in a vote, and whether to abstain in voting on a particular ...
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2 | |
15 | |
26 | |
Agenda | 44 |
Bargaining | 51 |
Tax on Beverages | 69 |
Government by Coalition | 73 |
Administering | 79 |
Bargaining among Executive and Two Houses | 217 |
Bargaining between Houses of Legislature | 223 |
Conference Committees Discretion | 224 |
Civil Rights Legislation and Bush Administration | 230 |
An Example | 234 |
Procedure Changes Power in European Union | 238 |
OPTIMAL RIGHTS | 241 |
Liberty as a Commodity | 247 |
Delegation Game | 82 |
Politics Civil Service and Courts | 96 |
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS | 101 |
Intergovernmental Relations | 103 |
Optimal Number of Governments | 104 |
Internalization Prescription for Government Jurisdiction | 107 |
Tied Grant | 117 |
Comprehensive or SinglePurpose Government? Horizontal Divisions | 120 |
Voters Net Benefits | 122 |
Government Competition | 127 |
Direct and Indirect Democracy | 143 |
Ministries and Agencies | 149 |
Agency Size | 152 |
Agencys Production Possibilities | 168 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS | 171 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS 17 l | 173 |
Bicameralism Protects Majority against Minority | 187 |
Executive | 189 |
Judiciary | 195 |
Judicial Preferences | 201 |
Oil Field with Wells | 206 |
Conclusion | 209 |
Liberty as Welfare | 253 |
Liberty and Redistribution | 261 |
Income Taxation and Redistribution | 262 |
Hierarchy of Desires | 270 |
State of Nature | 274 |
Property Rights | 279 |
Demand for state Restrictions by State Officials | 293 |
Value of Alternative Acts in Nollan | 300 |
Transferable Development Rights | 304 |
Free Speech | 309 |
Organizations Restricting Members Speech | 321 |
Conclusion | 331 |
Civil Rights | 333 |
Discriminatory Employees | 342 |
White Flight | 353 |
Summary and Conclusion | 359 |
Factoring Splicing and the Character of Politics | 361 |
Conclusion | 374 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 381 |
GENERAL INDEX | 399 |
Index of Names | 409 |