The Strategic ConstitutionPrinceton University Press, 30 มิ.ย. 2020 - 440 หน้า Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 60
... Protecting Individuals—Optimal Rights 367 Motives and the Institutions of Democracy 370 Interests 371 Reason 371 Passion 372 Will 373 Democracy's Superiority 373 Conclusion 374 Better Data and More Applications 374 The Internal Point of ...
... protection of private property is best for the supply of private and public goods? In answering such questions, Social science aspires to replace intuitive judgments with proofs. Unlike explicating the meaning, history, and philosophy ...
... protect its exercise. The absence of a sanction poses an obstacle to analysis by using price theory. 7 Koetz 1997. *For examples, see the selected papers from the annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, which ...
... protecting property rights explicitly. In contrast, some democratic constitutions drafted after the creation of the ... protect the liberty of citizens. Game theory provides a useful restatement of this goal. A player who follows the ...
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เนื้อหา
2 | |
15 | |
26 | |
Agenda | 44 |
Bargaining | 51 |
Tax on Beverages | 69 |
Government by Coalition | 73 |
Administering | 79 |
Bargaining among Executive and Two Houses | 217 |
Bargaining between Houses of Legislature | 223 |
Conference Committees Discretion | 224 |
Civil Rights Legislation and Bush Administration | 230 |
An Example | 234 |
Procedure Changes Power in European Union | 238 |
OPTIMAL RIGHTS | 241 |
Liberty as a Commodity | 247 |
Delegation Game | 82 |
Politics Civil Service and Courts | 96 |
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS | 101 |
Intergovernmental Relations | 103 |
Optimal Number of Governments | 104 |
Internalization Prescription for Government Jurisdiction | 107 |
Tied Grant | 117 |
Comprehensive or SinglePurpose Government? Horizontal Divisions | 120 |
Voters Net Benefits | 122 |
Government Competition | 127 |
Direct and Indirect Democracy | 143 |
Ministries and Agencies | 149 |
Agency Size | 152 |
Agencys Production Possibilities | 168 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS | 171 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS 17 l | 173 |
Bicameralism Protects Majority against Minority | 187 |
Executive | 189 |
Judiciary | 195 |
Judicial Preferences | 201 |
Oil Field with Wells | 206 |
Conclusion | 209 |
Liberty as Welfare | 253 |
Liberty and Redistribution | 261 |
Income Taxation and Redistribution | 262 |
Hierarchy of Desires | 270 |
State of Nature | 274 |
Property Rights | 279 |
Demand for state Restrictions by State Officials | 293 |
Value of Alternative Acts in Nollan | 300 |
Transferable Development Rights | 304 |
Free Speech | 309 |
Organizations Restricting Members Speech | 321 |
Conclusion | 331 |
Civil Rights | 333 |
Discriminatory Employees | 342 |
White Flight | 353 |
Summary and Conclusion | 359 |
Factoring Splicing and the Character of Politics | 361 |
Conclusion | 374 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 381 |
GENERAL INDEX | 399 |
Index of Names | 409 |