The Strategic ConstitutionPrinceton University Press, 30 มิ.ย. 2020 - 440 หน้า Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 45
... Speech CHAPTER 14. Civil Rights CHAPTER 15. Summary and Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY GENERAL INDEX INDEX OF NAMES 15 17 51 79 101 103 127 149 17 l 173 21 | 241 243 261 279 309 333 359 381 399 409 B R H E F C O N T E N T S.
... Speech 309 Free Speech and Valuable Talk 310 Political Speech 312 REGULATING POLITICAL EXPENDITURES 313 PACS 3.14 Commercial Speech 316 Pornography 317 PORNOGRAPHY TAX? 318 PORNOGRAPHY IN D E T A L L E D C O N T E N T S xiii.
... Speech, Your Network: Organizations Restricting Members' Speech 321 Freedom and Liability 324 Strict Liability v. Negligence in Libel Law 324 The Politician and the Mob 325 Able v. Best 327 Rain Developing toward Evening 327 Reasonable ...
... speech, and civil rights. I analyze the boundary between freedom and regulation of property, freedom and liability for speech, and discrimination and equality in competition. Finally, chapter 15 concludes the book by discussing the ...
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เนื้อหา
2 | |
15 | |
26 | |
Agenda | 44 |
Bargaining | 51 |
Tax on Beverages | 69 |
Government by Coalition | 73 |
Administering | 79 |
Bargaining among Executive and Two Houses | 217 |
Bargaining between Houses of Legislature | 223 |
Conference Committees Discretion | 224 |
Civil Rights Legislation and Bush Administration | 230 |
An Example | 234 |
Procedure Changes Power in European Union | 238 |
OPTIMAL RIGHTS | 241 |
Liberty as a Commodity | 247 |
Delegation Game | 82 |
Politics Civil Service and Courts | 96 |
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS | 101 |
Intergovernmental Relations | 103 |
Optimal Number of Governments | 104 |
Internalization Prescription for Government Jurisdiction | 107 |
Tied Grant | 117 |
Comprehensive or SinglePurpose Government? Horizontal Divisions | 120 |
Voters Net Benefits | 122 |
Government Competition | 127 |
Direct and Indirect Democracy | 143 |
Ministries and Agencies | 149 |
Agency Size | 152 |
Agencys Production Possibilities | 168 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS | 171 |
OPTIMAL DIVISION OF POWERS 17 l | 173 |
Bicameralism Protects Majority against Minority | 187 |
Executive | 189 |
Judiciary | 195 |
Judicial Preferences | 201 |
Oil Field with Wells | 206 |
Conclusion | 209 |
Liberty as Welfare | 253 |
Liberty and Redistribution | 261 |
Income Taxation and Redistribution | 262 |
Hierarchy of Desires | 270 |
State of Nature | 274 |
Property Rights | 279 |
Demand for state Restrictions by State Officials | 293 |
Value of Alternative Acts in Nollan | 300 |
Transferable Development Rights | 304 |
Free Speech | 309 |
Organizations Restricting Members Speech | 321 |
Conclusion | 331 |
Civil Rights | 333 |
Discriminatory Employees | 342 |
White Flight | 353 |
Summary and Conclusion | 359 |
Factoring Splicing and the Character of Politics | 361 |
Conclusion | 374 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 381 |
GENERAL INDEX | 399 |
Index of Names | 409 |