Indian civil servant quoted by Mr. Spencer, various other hill tribes, originally distinguished by their veracity, have afterwards been rendered less veracious by contact with the whites.1

Of the Andaman Islanders Mr. Man observes :—“It has been remarked with regret by all interested in the race, that intercourse with the alien population has, generally speaking, prejudicially affected their morals; and that the candour, veracity, and self-reliance they manifest in their savage and untutored state are, when they become associated with foreigners, to a great extent lost, and habits of untruthfulness, dependence, and sloth engendered."2 Riedel makes a similar remark with reference to the natives of Ambon and Uliase.3 Mr. Sommerville believes that the natives of New Georgia, in the Solomon Islands, learned their practice of cheating from European traders.+

Among the Ostyaks increasing civilisation has proved injurious to their ancient honesty, and those who live in the neighbourhood of towns or large villages have become even more deceitful than the colonists. A similar change has taken place with other tribes belonging to the Russian Empire, for instance the Tunguses and Kamchadales.7

6

We hear the same story from America. Among the Omahas "formerly only two or three were notorious liars; but now, there are about twenty who do not lie." The old men of the Ojibwas all agree in saying that before the white man came and resided among them there was less lying than there is now.10 The Indians of Mexico, Lumholtz writes, "do not tell the truth unless it suits them." 11 But with reference to some of them, the Tarahumares, he adds that, where they have had little or nothing to do with the whites, they are trustworthy, and profit is no inducement to them, as they believe

North-East of Siberia,' in Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages, v. 67.

8 Domenech, Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts of North America, ii. 69. Cf. Hearne, Journey to the Northern Ocean, pp. 307, 308, 310 (Chippewyans); Morgan, League of the Iroquois, p. 335 sq.

9 Dorsey, Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 370. 10 Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, ii. 139.

11 Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, ii. 477.

that their gods would be angry with them for charging an undue price.1

The deceitfulness of many African peoples is undoubtedly in some degree a result of their intercourse with foreigners. In Sierra Leone, says Winterbottom, the natives on the sea coast, who are chiefly engaged in commerce, "are in general shrewd and artful, sometimes malevolent and perfidious. Their long connection with European slave traders has tutored them in the arts of deceit." The Yorubas, according to Burton, are eminently dishonest only "in and around the cities." Among the Kalunda those who live near the great caravan roads and have had much to do with foreign traders are suspicious and false. And the Hottentots, of whose truthfulness earlier writers spoke very highly, are nowadays said to be addicted to lying.5

It has also been noticed that mendacity is favoured among children by much intercourse with strangers, when "first impressions" are consciously made, as also by frequent change of environment, or of school or residence, as such changes give rise to a feeling that "new leaves" can be easily turned.

When a social unit is composed of loosely connected sub-groups, the intercourse between members of different sub-groups resembles in many respects that between foreigners. Social incoherence is thus apt to lead to deceitful habits, as was the case in the Middle Ages. The same phenomenon is to be observed in the East; perhaps also among the Desert Arabs and the Fuegians, who live in small parties which only occasionally meet and soon again separate.

Another factor which has favoured deception is social differentiation. The different classes of society have often little sympathy for each other, their interests are not infrequently conflicting, deceit is a means of procuring advantages, and, for the inferior classes especially, a means of self-protection. As Euripides observes, slaves are in

the habit of concealing the truth.' In Eastern Africa, says Livingstone, falsehood is a vice prevailing among the free, but still more among the slaves; "one can scarcely induce a slave to translate anything truly: he is so intent on thinking of what will please." 2

3

In

Hardly anything has been a greater inducement to falsehood than oppression. Whilst the old Makololo were truthful, this is not the case with their sons, "who, having been brought up among the subjected tribes, have acquired some of the vices peculiar to a menial and degraded race. The Wanyoro, who are described as "splendid liars," exercised deception chiefly to evade the intolerable exactions of their own chiefs, whereas they are fairly truthful in contact with Europeans who attempt to treat them justly. The duplicity and cunning of the Malagasy are "the natural result of centuries of superstition, ignorance, and submission to the rule of tyrannical despots, with whom the spy system has always been a necessity." Morocco the independent Jbâla, or mountaineers of the North, are more to be trusted than the Arabs of the plains, who have long been suffering from the extortions of rapacious officials. The duplicity of Orientals is very largely due to their despotic form of government. In India, Mr. Percival observes, "despotism in one form or other that has so long prevailed, and the consequent oppression attendant thereon, must have rendered it difficult to make way without fraud. Deception and arts of cunning, under such circumstances, being the only means at the command of the inferior portions of the community for gaining their ends, and securing the plainest rights, they would resort to them as the only way of avoiding certain ruin."7 The Chinese habit of lying has

1 Euripides, Phanissa, 392. Cf. Burton, Arabian Nights, i. 176, n. I. 2 Livingstone, Expedition to the Zambesi, p. 309. See also Polack, Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders, ii. 59.

3 Livingstone, Expedition to the Zambesi, p. 283.

* Johnston, Uganda Protectorate, ii.

591.

5 Little, Madagascar, p. 72.

6 Vámbéry, Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, p. 231.

7 Percival, Land of the Veda, p. 288. Cf. Malcolm, Memoir of Central India, ii. 171; Hodgson, Miscellaneous Essays, i. 152.

been attributed partly to the truckling fear of officers.1 In China and many other parts of the East, says Sir J. Bowring, "there is a fear of truth as truth, lest its discovery should lead to consequences of which the inquirer. never dreams, but which are present to the mind of the person under interrogation.""

The regard for truth displays itself not only in the condemnation of falsehood, but in the idea that, under certain circumstances, it is a person's duty to inform others of the truth, although there is no deception in withholding it. This duty is limited by utilitarian considerations, and it is less insisted on than the duty of refraining from falsehood; positive commandments, as we have seen, are generally less stringent than the corresponding negative commandments. But to disclose the truth for the benefit of others, when it is attended with injurious consequences for the person who discloses it, can hardly fail to evoke moral approval, and may be deemed a merit of the highest

order.

The regard for truth goes a step further still. It may be obligatory or praiseworthy not only to spread the knowledge of truth, but to seek for it. The possession of knowledge, of some kind or other, is universally respected. A Wolof proverb says, "Not to know is bad, not to wish to know is worse." 4 In the moral and religious systems of the East knowledge is one of the chief pursuits of man. Confucius described virtue as consisting of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour." The ancients, he says, "wishing to rectify their hearts, . . . first desired to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.' Knowledge is to be pursued not for theoretical, but for

1 Wells Williams, The Middle King

dom, i. 835.

Bowring, Siam, i. 105 sq.

* Supra, i. 303 sqq.

Burton, Wit and Wisdom from

West Africa, p. 6.

5 Chung Yung, xx. 8. Douglas, Confucianism and Taouism, p. 105.

Tâ Hsio, 4.

moral purposes; the Master said, "It is not easy to find a man who has learned for three years without coming to be good." The Hindus maintain that ignorance is the greatest of evils, and that the sole and ultimate object of life should be to give and receive instruction. It is said in the Laws of Manu, "A man is not therefore considered venerable because his head is gray; him who, though young, has learned the Veda, the gods consider to be venerable." 3 According to the Mahabharata, it is by knowledge that a creature is liberated, by knowledge that he becomes the Eternal, Imperceptible, and Undecaying.* Buddhism regards sin as folly and delusion as the cause of crime; "the unwise man cannot discover the difference between that which is evil and that which is good, as a child knows not the value of a coin that is placed before him.' And the highest of all gifts, the source of abiding salvation, is the knowledge of the identity between the individual and God, in whom and by whom the individual lives, and moves, and has his being. According to one of the Pahlavi texts, wisdom is better than wealth of any kind; through the power of wisdom it is possible to do every duty and good work; the religion of the Mazda-worshippers is apprehended more fully by means of the most perfect wisdom, and "even the struggle and warfare of Iran with foreigners, and the smiting of Aharman and the demons it is possible to effect through

the

8

9

power of wisdom." 10 A strong dash of intellectualism is a prominent feature in the Rabbinic religion. The highest virtue lies not only in the fulfilment but in the study of the law. There is a special merit bound up in it that will assist man both in this world and in the world to come; and it is said that even a bastard who is learned in

1 Lun Yü, viii. 12. Cf. Faber, Digest of the Doctrines of Confucius, p. 60; de Lanessan, La morale des philosophes chinois, p. 27.

2 Percival, Land of the Veda, p. 263.

3 Laws of Manu, ii. 156.

4 Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, v.

5 Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures on the History of Buddhism, p. 208.

6

Hardy, Manual of Budhism, p.

505 Rhys Davids, op. cit. p. 209.

8 Dina- Mainôg-î Khirad, xlvii. 6. 9 Ibid. i. 54.

10 Ibid. lvii. 15 sq.