criminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or both, pp. 193-198.-Punishment may also be applied as a means of deterring from crime, p. 198 sq.-But the scope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide, p. 199.-The criminal law of a community on the whole a faithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community at large, pp. 199-201.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED
MORAL JUDGMENTS

Definitions of the term "conduct," p. 202 sq.-The meaning of the word "act," p. 203 sq.-The meaning of the word " intention," p. 204.-There can be only one intention in one act, p. 204 sq.-The moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. 205 sq. -A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.-A deliberate wish is a volition, p. 206 sq.-The meaning of the word "motive," p. 207.-Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation, ibid. The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act, ibid.-Even motives which consist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p. 207 sq.-Refutation of Mill's statement that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action," p. 208 sq.-Moral judgments really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. 209.-Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 sq.-Distinction between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.-Moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to omissions, p. 210 sq.-Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211. -Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the "will," p. 211 sq.-Distinction between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.—The "known concomitants of acts," p. 213.—Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. 213 sq. -The meaning of the term "conduct," p. 214.-The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will, or character, conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 sq.-Moral judgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. 215 sq.

CHAPTER IX

THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS

Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries, pp. 217-219.-Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. 219-221.-A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. 221 sq.-Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident, p. 222 sq.-Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing about events without any fault of theirs, pp. 223-226.-At the earlier stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, pp. 226-231.-Explanation of all these facts, pp. 231-237.-The great influence which the outward event exercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. 238-240.-Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result follows, p. 241.-An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less

severely than the accomplished act, p. 241 sq.- Exceptions to this rule, p. 242.-The question, which attempts should be punished, p. 243.-The stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between attempts and acts of preparation, p. 243 sq.-The rule that an outward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. 244 sq.-Exceptions to this rule, p. 245.-Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp. 245-247.-Moral approval influenced by external events, p. 247.-Owing to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise, p. 247 sq.

CHAPTER X

AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

An agent not responsible for anything which he could not be aware of, p. 249.— The irresponsibility of animals, pp. 249-251.- Resentment towards an animal which has caused some injury, p. 251.-At the lower stages of civilisation animals deliberately treated as responsible beings, ibid.-The custom of blood-revenge extended to the animal world, pp. 251-253.—Animals exposed to regular punishment, pp. 253-255.—The origin of the medieval practice of punishing animals, p. 255 sq.-Explanation of the practice of retaliating upon animals, pp. 256-260.-At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things treated as if they were responsible agents, pp. 26c-262.-Explanation of this, pp. 262-264.-The total or partial irresponsibility of childhood and early youth, pp. 264-267.—According to early custom, children sometimes subject to the rule of retaliation, p. 267.—Parents responsible for the deeds of their children, p. 267 sq.—In Europe there has been a tendency to raise the age at which full legal responsibility commences, p. 268 sq.-The irresponsibility of idiots and madmen, p. 269 sq.-Idiots and insane persons objects of religious reverence, p. 270 sq. —Lunatics treated with great severity or punished for their deeds, pp. 271-274.-Explanation of this, p. 274 sq.The ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the hands of lawyers, pp. 275-277.-The total or partial irresponsibility of intoxicated persons, p. 277 sq.-Drunkenness recognised as a ground of extenuation, pp. 278–280. -Not recognised as a ground of extenuation, p. 280 sq.-Explanation of these facts, p. 281 sq.

CHAPTER XI

66

MOTIVES

Motives considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection, p. 283.-Little consideration for the sense of duty as a motive, ibid. -Somewhat greater discrimination shown in regard to motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations, p. 283 sq.-Compulsion as a ground of extenuation, p. 284 sq.- Compulsion by necessity," pp. 285-287.-Selfdefence, pp. 288-290.-Self-redress in the case of adultery, and other survivals of the old system of self-redress, pp. 290-294.-The moral distinction made between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, on provocation, pp. 294–297.—Explanation of this distinction, p. 297 sq.—The pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will as a ground of extenuation, p. 298 sq.That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good not only of moral blame, but of moral praise, pp. 299–302.

CHAPTER XII

FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS-CHARACTER

Why in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments are much more prominent than the positive commandments, p. 303.-The little cognisance which the criminal laws of civilised nations take of forbearances and omissions, p. 303 sq.-The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to positive commandments, p. 304 sq.-Yet the customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive injunctions as well, p. 305. —The unreflecting mind apt to exaggerate the guilt of a person who out of heedlessness or rashness causes harm by a positive act, ibid.-Early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event to its source, pp. 305-307.-But they easily fail to discover where there is guilt or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender's guilt, p. 307 sq.-The opinion that a person is answerable for all the damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight could have reasonably been expected to look out for it, p. 308 sq.-On the other hand, little or no censure passed on him whose want of foresight or want of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently remote, p. 309 sq.-The moral emotions may as naturally give rise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human conduct, p. 310.-Even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the agent's will as a whole, p. 310 sq.-The practice of punishing a second or third offence more severely than the first, p. 311 sq.-The more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character which manifests itself in that individual piece of conduct by which the judgment is occasioned, p. 312 sq.-But however superficial it be, it always refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, p. 313.

CHAPTER XIII

WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER-MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

Explanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, p. 314. The correctness of this explanation proved by the circumstance that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments are passed, pp. 314-319.-Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain, p. 319.-The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. 319 sq.--The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the problem of the coexistence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect, p. 320. The theory according to which responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes, p. 320 sq.—Yet, as a matter of fact, moral indignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and libertarians alike, p. 321 sq.-Explanation of the fallacy which lies at the bottom of the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism, p. 322. Causation confounded with compulsion, pp. 322-324.-The difference between fatalism and determinism, pp. 324-326.-The moral emotions not concerned with the origin of the innate character, p. 326.

CHAPTER XIV

PRELIMINARY REMARKS-HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

Necessity of restricting the investigation to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness is concerned, p. 327 sq.-The six groups into which these modes of conduct may be divided, p. 328.-The most sacred duty which we owe to our fellow-creatures generally considered to be regard for their lives, ibid.—Among various uncivilised peoples human life said to be held very cheap, p. 328 sq.- Among others homicide or murder said to be hardly known, p. 329 sq.-In other instances homicide expressly said to be regarded as wrong, p. 330 sq.-In every society custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men, p. 331.-Savages distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger, pp. 331-333.—In various instances, however, the rule, "Thou shalt not kill," applies even to foreigners, p. 333 sq.-Some uncivilised peoples said to have no wars, p. 334.-Savages' recognition of intertribal rights in times of peace obvious from certain customs connected with their wars, p. 334 sq.-Savage custom does not always allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare, p. 335 sq.-The readiness with which savages engage in war, p. 337.-The old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains among peoples more advanced in culture, p. 337 sq.-The readiness with which such peoples wage war on foreign nations, and the estimation in which the successful warrior is held, pp. 338-340.-The life of a guest sacred, p. 340.-The commencement of international hostilities preceded by special ceremonies, ibid.-Warfare in some cases condemned, or a distinction made between just and unjust war, pp. 340-342.-Even in war the killing of an enemy under certain circumstances prohibited, either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion, pp. 342-344.

CHAPTER XV

HOMICIDE IN GENERAL (continued)

Homicide of any kind condemned by the early Christians, p. 345.-Their total condemnation of warfare, p. 345 sq.-This attitude towards war was soon given up, pp. 346-348.-The feeling that a soldier scarcely could make a good Christian, p. 348.-Penance prescribed for those who had shed blood in war, p. 348 sq.-Wars forbidden by popes, p. 349.-The military Christianity of the Crusades, pp. 349–352.—Chivalry, pp. 352-354.-The intimate connection between chivalry and religion displayed in tournaments, p. 354 sq.-The prac tice of private war, p. 355 sq.-The attitude of the Church towards private war, P. 356.--The Truce of God, p. 357.-The main cause of the abolition of private war was the increase of the authority of emperors or kings, p. 357 sq. --War looked upon as a judgment of God, p. 358.-The attitude adopted by the great Christian congregations towards war one of sympathetic approval, pp. 359-362.-Religious protests against war, pp. 362-365.-Freethinkers' opposition to war, pp. 365–367.—The idea of a perpetual peace, p. 367.— The awakening spirit of nationalism, and the glorification of war, p. 367 sq. --Arguments against arbitration, p. 368.-The opposition against war rapidly increasing, p. 368 sq.-The prohibition of needless destruction in war, p. 369 sq.-The survival, in modern civilisation, of the old feeling that the life of a foreigner is not equally sacred with that of a countryman, p. 370.-The behaviour of European colonists towards coloured races, p. 370 sq.

CHAPTER XVI

HOMICIDE IN GENERAL (concluded.)

Sympathetic resentment felt on account of the injury suffered by the victim a potent cause of the condemnation of homicide, p. 372 sq.-No such resentment felt if the victim is a member of another group, p. 373.-Why extra-tribal homicide is approved of, ibid.—Superstition an encouragement to extra-tribal homicide, ibid.-The expansion of the altruistic sentiment largely explains why the prohibition of homicide has come to embrace more and more comprehensive circles of men, ibid.-Homicide viewed as an injury inflicted upon the survivors, p. 373 sq.—Conceived as a breach of the "King's peace," P. 374. Stigmatised as a disturbance of public tranquillity and an outrage on public safety, ibid.—Homicide disapproved of because the manslayer gives trouble to his own people, p. 374 sq.-The idea that a manslayer is unclean, PP. 375-377.—The influence which this idea has exercised on the moral judgment of homicide, p. 377.-The disapproval of the deed easily enhanced by the spiritual danger attending on it, as also by the inconvenient restrictions laid on the tabooed manslayer and the ceremonies of purification to which he is subject, p. 377 sq.-The notion of a persecuting ghost may be replaced by the notion of an avenging god, pp. 378-380.-The defilement resulting from homicide particularly shunned by gods, p. 380 sq.-Priests forbidden to shed human blood, p. 381 sq.-Reasons for Christianity's high regard for human life, p. 382.

CHAPTER XVII

THE KILLING OF PARENTS, SICK PERSONS, CHILDREN-FETICIDE Parricide the most aggravated form of murder, pp. 383-386.—The custom of abandoning or killing parents who are worn out with age or disease, p. 386 sq.—Its causes, pp. 387-390.-The custom of abandoning or killing persons suffering from some illness, p. 391 sq.-Its causes, p. 392 sq.-The father's power of life and death over his children, p. 393 sq.-Infanticide among many savage races permitted or even enjoined by custom, pp. 394–398. —The causes of infanticide, and how it has grown into a regular custom, pp. 398-402.—Among many savages infanticide said to be unheard of or almost so, p. 402 sq.The custom of infanticide not a survival of earliest savagery, but seems to have grown up under specific conditions in later stages of development, p. 403.-Savages who disapprove of infanticide, p. 403 sq.-The custom of infanticide in most cases requires that the child should be killed immediately or soon after its birth, p. 404 sq.-Infanticide among semi-civilised or civilised races, pp. 405-411.-The practice of exposing new-born infants vehemently denounced by the early Fathers of the Church, p. 411.-Christian horror of infanticide, p. 411 sq.-The punishment of infanticide in Christian countries, p. 412 sq.-Feticide among savages, p. 413 sq.-Among more civilised nations, p. 414 sq.-According to Christian views, a form of murder, p. 415 sq. -Distinction between an embryo informatus and an embryo formatus, p. 416 sq.-Modern legislation and opinion concerning feticide, p. 417.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE KILLING OF WOMEN, AND OF SLAVES-THE CRIMINALITY OF HOMICIDE INFLUENCED BY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS

The husband's power of life and death over his wife among many of the lower races, p. 418 sq.-The right of punishing his wife capitally not universally