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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

The origin of the present investigation, p. 1.-Its subject-matter, p. 1 sq.-Its

practical usefulness, p. 2 sq.

or

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena

to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.—The assumed universality or “ob-
jectivity” of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.-Theories according to which the
moral predicates derive all their import from reason, “theoretical”
“practical,” p. ? 59.- Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments no
sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.-This
tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral con-
sciousness, \p. 9.--Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances
of a purely intellectual character, pp. 9–11.-Differences of an emotional

origin, pp. 11-13. -Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences,l p. 13.-

"The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority

ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.- The origin and nature of this authority,

pp. 14-17.-General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.—The object of

scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral

consciousness as a fact, p. 18.—The supposed dangers of ethical subjective

ism, pp. 18-20.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and approval,

p. 21.—The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a sub-

species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly

emotion, ibid.Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind towards a cause

of pain, p. 22 59:-Dr. Steinmetz's suggestion that revenge is essentially

rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally “undirected,"

pp. 23-27.-The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this

hypothesis, pp. 27-30.—The collective responsibility usually involved in the

institution of the blood-feud, pp. 30–32. — Explanation of it, pp. 32–35. —

The strong tendency to discrimination which characterises resentment not

wholly lost even behind the veil of common responsibility, p. 35 sq.-
Revenge among the lower animals, p. 37 sq.- Violation of the "self-
feeling” a common incentive to resentment, p. 38 sq.-But the reaction of
the wounded “self-feeling not necessarily, in the first place, concerned
with the infliction of pain, p: 39 sq.-Revenge only a link in a chain of
emotional phenomena for which“ non-moral resentment" may be used as a
common name, p. 40.—The origin of these phenomena, pp. 40-42.-Moral
indignation closely connected with anger, p. 42 sq.-Moral indignation, like
non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards the
cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction sometimes turns against innocent
persons, pp. 43-48.-In their administration of justice gods still more
indiscriminate than men, pp. 48-51.—Reasons for this, p: 5: 59.-Sin looked

upon in the light of a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy,

pp. 52-57.—The curse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or

destroying anybody to whom it cleaves, p. 57 sq.---The tendency of curses

to spread, pp. 58-60.-Their tendency to contaminate those who derive

their origin from the infected individual, p. 60 sq.-The vicarious suffering

involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with vicarious expiatory

sacrifice, p. 61.-Why scapegoats are sometimes killed, pp. 61-64. —Why

sacrificial victims are sometimes used as scapegoats, p. 64 59:--Vicarious

expiatory sacrifices, pp. 65-67.—The victim accepted as a substitute on the

principle of social solidarity, p. 67 sq.-Expiatory sacrifices offered as

ransoms, p. 68 sq.- Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction

of penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. 70-72.

Whilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction

involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent, its aggressive

character has become more disguised, p. 73. – Kindness to enemies not a

rule in early ethics, p. 73 sq.-At the higher stages of moral development

retaliation condemned and forgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty,

pp. 74-77.—The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically

opposed to each other, p. 77 sq.-Why enlightened and sympathetic minds

disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives,

p. 78 sq.- The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become

more disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays

itself, p. 79.-Retributive punishment condemned, and the end of punishinent

considered to be either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal, or to

repress crime by eliminating or secluding him, pp. 79-81.--Objections to these

theories, p. 82 59:-Facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between the

theory of retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. 84-91. –

The aggressive element in moral disapproval has undergone a change which

tends to conceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it

discharges itself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn

against the will rather than against the willer, p. 91 9.-Yet it is the

instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its

most important characteristic, p. 92 sq.- Retributive kindly emotion a

friendly attitude of mind towards à cause of pleasure, p. 93 sq. --Retributive

kindly emotion among the lower animals, p. 94. Its intrinsic object,

p. 94 sq.—The want of discrimination which is sometimes found in retributive

kindliness, p. 95.-Moral approval a kind of retributive kindly emotion,

ibid. --Moral approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving

individuals for the merits of others, pp. 95-97.-- Explanation of this,

p. 97 sq.-- Protests against the notion of vicarious merit, p. 98 sq.

on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person

with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a

kindly interest, p: 108.-Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109

sq.-Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take

a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce

disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 sq.-Sympathetic resentment to be

found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 sq.---

Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 sq.-Sympathetic resentment

may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly

produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.),

pp. 114-116. -Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 sq.-Sympathy springing

from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion,

p. 117.-Disinterested likings, ibid.-Why disinterestedness, apparent im-

partiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by

which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive

emotions, p. 117 sq.-Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct,

p. 118.-Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 sq.-In early society

customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119.-The characteristics of

moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.-

Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent im-

partiality, p. 120 sq.-Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a

moral rule, p. 121 59.- As public indignation is the prototype of moral dis-

approval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122. —

Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably con-

nected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 sq.-Yet they remain

to the last public emotions—if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123. —

Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness

has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 sq.—The antiquity of moral

resentment, p. 124.–The supposition that remorse is unknown among the

lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 sq.-Criticism of Lord Avebury's

statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in
moral feeling, pp. 125-129. --The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 sq.

How we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large, p. 158.—The

close connection between the habitualness and the obligatoriness of custom,

p. 159.-Though every public habit is not a custom, involving an obligation,

men's standard of morality is not independent of their practice, p. 159 sq:-

The study of moral ideas to a large extent a study of customs, p. 160.--But

custom never covers the whole field of morality, and the uncovered space

grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. 160 $9.-

At the lower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct, p. 161.

Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. 162.-In competition with

law custom frequently carries the day, p. 163 sq.--Custom stronger than law

and religion combined, p. 164.-The laws themselves command obedience

more as customs than as laws, ibid.—Many laws were customs before they

became laws, p. 165.-The transformation of customs into laws, p. 165 sq.-

Laws as expressions of moral ideas, pp. 166-168.-Punishment and indemni-

fication, p. 168 sq.-Definition of punishment, p. 169 sq.--Savage punishments

inflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. 170-173. - By some

person or persons invested with judicial authority, pp. 173-175. — The develop-

ment of judicial organisation out of a previous system of lynch-law, p. 175:-

Out of a previous system of private revenge, p. 176. — Public indignation

displays itself not only in punishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of

revenge, p. 176 sq.-The social origin of the lex talionis, pp. 177-180.—The

transition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a central judi.

cial and executive authority, pp. 180-183.— The jurisdiction of chiefs, p. 183 sq.

-The injured party or the accuser acting as executioner, but not as judge,

p. 184 sq.—The existence of punishment and judicial organisation among a

certain people no exact index to its general state of culture, p. 185.- The

supposition that punishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. 185 sq.

-Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has

assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the lex talionis, pp. 186-

188.—Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic of the public justice of

savages, pp. 188-190. -Legislators referring to the deterrent effects of punish-
ment, p. 190 sq.-The practice of punishing criminals in public, p. 191 sq:-
The punishment actually inflicted on the criminal in many cases much less
severe than the punishment with which the law threatens him, p. 192 sq.-
The detection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more uncertain
than it is now, p. 193.—The chief explanation of the great severity of certain

Definitions of the term "conduct," p. 202 sq.- The meaning of the word “act,”

p. 203 59.- The meaning of the word " intention,” p. 204.— There can be

only one intention in one act, p. 204 sq.—The moral judgments which we

pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. 205 sq.

-A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.-A

deliberate wish is a volition, p. 206 sq:--The meaning of the word “motive,"

p. 207.-Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation,

ibid.The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging

to another act, ibid.-Even motives which consist of non-volitional cona-

tions may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p.

207 sq.-Refutation of Mill's statement that “the motive has nothing to

do with the morality of the action," p. 208 sq.-Moral judgments really

passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract,

p. 209. - Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 sq.-Distinction

between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.-Moral judgments refer not

only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances,

but to omissions, p. 210 sq.-Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.

- Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this
not-willing is attributed to a defect of the “will,” p. 211 sq.Distinction
between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to
refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.—The “known concomitants of
acts," p. 213: --Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. 213 sq.

- The meaning of the term “conduct," p. 214.-The subject of a moral
judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will, or character, conceived as the
cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 sq.-Moral judg-
ments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. 215 sq.

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