Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 6 - 10 จาก 78
หน้า 1870
... Italy, different forms of corruption — party, clan, gang, and entrepreneurial corruption — have been distinguished according to the actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main ...
... Italy, different forms of corruption — party, clan, gang, and entrepreneurial corruption — have been distinguished according to the actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main ...
หน้า 1872
... Italian Christian Democrats ( DC ) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long ... Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
... Italian Christian Democrats ( DC ) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long ... Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
หน้า 1874
... Italy, in the south the process of political representation developed as clientelistic because the peasants were in ... Italy for 45 years. He claims that the social and economic transformation of southern Italy in the last twenty years ...
... Italy, in the south the process of political representation developed as clientelistic because the peasants were in ... Italy for 45 years. He claims that the social and economic transformation of southern Italy in the last twenty years ...
หน้า 1877
... Italy: Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Blok, A. (1974), The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Harper & Row, New York. Briquet, J-L ...
... Italy: Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Blok, A. (1974), The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, Harper & Row, New York. Briquet, J-L ...
หน้า 1878
... Italy ' , European Journal of Political Research , vol . 1 , pp . 3–34 . Heywood , P. ( ed ) ( 1997 ) , Political ... Italian Politics , Princeton University Press , Princeton . Lémieux , V. ( 1977 ) , Le patronage politique : Une etude ...
... Italy ' , European Journal of Political Research , vol . 1 , pp . 3–34 . Heywood , P. ( ed ) ( 1997 ) , Political ... Italian Politics , Princeton University Press , Princeton . Lémieux , V. ( 1977 ) , Le patronage politique : Une etude ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes