Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 6 - 10 จาก 84
หน้า 1865
... Japan relations. His dissertation at Columbia University was published in Japan, titled as How a Japanese Diet Member is Elected (2000, in Japanese). His article on the LDP faction appeared in Asian Survey in 2001. The most recent ...
... Japan relations. His dissertation at Columbia University was published in Japan, titled as How a Japanese Diet Member is Elected (2000, in Japanese). His article on the LDP faction appeared in Asian Survey in 2001. The most recent ...
หน้า 1867
... politics and pork-barrel politics (Lémieux, 1977; Shefter, 1977); • personal support clubs, such as the koenkai in Japan; • center-periphery relations (Blok, 1974; Tarrow, 1977); • • • • the exchange of votes and benefits.
... politics and pork-barrel politics (Lémieux, 1977; Shefter, 1977); • personal support clubs, such as the koenkai in Japan; • center-periphery relations (Blok, 1974; Tarrow, 1977); • • • • the exchange of votes and benefits.
หน้า 1869
... Japan. We are convinced that findings acquired in this volume will contribute to making our democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of political clientelism and political ...
... Japan. We are convinced that findings acquired in this volume will contribute to making our democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of political clientelism and political ...
หน้า 1872
... institutions do much to explain the DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
... institutions do much to explain the DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
หน้า 1873
... Japan's postwar politics that was , in short , a conflict between conservatives and reformists . According to Zenichiro Tanaka , this confrontation emerged on Japan's political landscape at the end of the Occupation and appeared to ...
... Japan's postwar politics that was , in short , a conflict between conservatives and reformists . According to Zenichiro Tanaka , this confrontation emerged on Japan's political landscape at the end of the Occupation and appeared to ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes