Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 ÁÕ.¤. 2017 - 248 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 6 - 10 ¨Ò¡ 49
˹éÒ 1872
... Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long incumbencies , well - structured factions , and the cultivation of clienteles . The authors find that patterns in interfactional rivalry over offices ...
... Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , parties distinguished by unusually long incumbencies , well - structured factions , and the cultivation of clienteles . The authors find that patterns in interfactional rivalry over offices ...
˹éÒ 1876
... Japanese variant nor a follower of the Japanese style of clientelism. Despite this variation, the author maintains that the gradual disintegration of clientelism is occurring in both countries. This book grew out of an international ...
... Japanese variant nor a follower of the Japanese style of clientelism. Despite this variation, the author maintains that the gradual disintegration of clientelism is occurring in both countries. This book grew out of an international ...
˹éÒ 1880
... Japanese) suggests an outmoded phenomenon. From a modern point of view, this kind of relationship is thought of as being somewhat feudalistic and old-fashioned. As morals and ethics demand a degree of independence, affiliations of this ...
... Japanese) suggests an outmoded phenomenon. From a modern point of view, this kind of relationship is thought of as being somewhat feudalistic and old-fashioned. As morals and ethics demand a degree of independence, affiliations of this ...
˹éÒ 1885
... Japanese . However , here , let us make a theoretical distinction between ' official ' or ' governmental ' ( kou ) from ' public ' ( koukyou ) ( Yamawaki , 2004 ) . I will basically employ the word ' official ' to mean ' official ...
... Japanese . However , here , let us make a theoretical distinction between ' official ' or ' governmental ' ( kou ) from ' public ' ( koukyou ) ( Yamawaki , 2004 ) . I will basically employ the word ' official ' to mean ' official ...
˹éÒ 1905
... Japanese (kouzou oshoku is the term proposed by Tetsurou Murobushi, 1980). Needless to say, 'small corruption = bribery' involving individual officials is an occurrence that should be criticized as a misuse of power. But, in a case in ...
... Japanese (kouzou oshoku is the term proposed by Tetsurou Murobushi, 1980). Needless to say, 'small corruption = bribery' involving individual officials is an occurrence that should be criticized as a misuse of power. But, in a case in ...
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1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes