The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisColumbia University Press, 1 µ.¤. 2010 - 304 ˹éÒ The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
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¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 6 - 10 ¨Ò¡ 84
˹éÒ 4
... capital flows in the early 1990s, including not only the mobile portfolio capital of hedge funds and ''speculators,'' but extensive bank. 1. One prescient warning was Park (1996). 4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 ...
... capital flows in the early 1990s, including not only the mobile portfolio capital of hedge funds and ''speculators,'' but extensive bank. 1. One prescient warning was Park (1996). 4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 ...
˹éÒ 5
... capital flows was partly the result of an important policy development. All the high-growth countries in the region (with the notable exception of China and arguably Taiwan) had either opened their capital accounts some time earlier or ...
... capital flows was partly the result of an important policy development. All the high-growth countries in the region (with the notable exception of China and arguably Taiwan) had either opened their capital accounts some time earlier or ...
˹éÒ 6
... capital controls fed directly into this debate about the weight of external influences (Krugman 1998d, 1999; Montes 1998; Wade and Veneroso 1998). If short-term capital movements were the proximate cause of the crisis, couldn't such ...
... capital controls fed directly into this debate about the weight of external influences (Krugman 1998d, 1999; Montes 1998; Wade and Veneroso 1998). If short-term capital movements were the proximate cause of the crisis, couldn't such ...
˹éÒ 9
... capital mobility. In all four countries, government intervention in and through the financial sector created perverse incentives with respect to INTRODUCTION 9 the ability of banks to monitor their clients and politicized Institute for ...
... capital mobility. In all four countries, government intervention in and through the financial sector created perverse incentives with respect to INTRODUCTION 9 the ability of banks to monitor their clients and politicized Institute for ...
˹éÒ 13
... capital markets, in corporate practice, and in the terms of competition in particular markets, but they are gradually reforming the nature of business-government relations in the region. The problems of financial and corporate ...
... capital markets, in corporate practice, and in the terms of competition in particular markets, but they are gradually reforming the nature of business-government relations in the region. The problems of financial and corporate ...
à¹×éÍËÒ
1 | |
15 | |
Ch
2 Incumbent Governments and the Politics of Crisis Management | 47 |
Ch 3 Crisis Political Change and Economic Reform | 86 |
Ch 4 The Politics of Financial and Corporate Restructuring | 139 |
Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract | 183 |
A New Asian Miracle | 217 |
References | 239 |
Index | 255 |
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administrative Anwar Asia ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS assets authoritarian banking sector bankruptcy billion bumiputra business-government relations capital central bank chaebol chapter Chinese Chuan CLOB coalition controls corporate governance corporate restructuring corruption countries country’s crises CRISIS MANAGEMENT Danaharta debt democracies democratic Development Eastern Economic Review ECONOMIC REFORM effects efforts elections electoral finance companies financial and corporate financial institutions financial sector firms fiscal foreign funds Golkar government’s groups growth Habibie Hanbo IBRA important incentives increase INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS Indonesia industrial initial interest investment investors issues Jomo Kim Dae Jung Kim Young Kim Young Sam labor legislative liberalization Mahathir Malaysia ment moral hazard National opposition particularly party percent Philippines POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMY president private sector problems recapitalization region regulatory Renong ringgit risk role rule share social contract South Korea state-owned strategy substantial Suharto Table Thai Thailand tion transparency UMNO urban vulnerable World Bank