Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 ÁÕ.¤. 2017 - 248 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
¨Ò¡´éÒ¹ã¹Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í
¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 11 - 15 ¨Ò¡ 83
˹éÒ 1882
... economic modernization. The. Structuralist. Theory. of. Clientelism. Originally, even in theories on dyadic exchange relationships, the following issues could be observed: As the persuasive influence of nationalism penetrated local areas ...
... economic modernization. The. Structuralist. Theory. of. Clientelism. Originally, even in theories on dyadic exchange relationships, the following issues could be observed: As the persuasive influence of nationalism penetrated local areas ...
˹éÒ 1888
... economics . For example , ' A corrupt civil servant regards his public offices as a business , the income of which he will ... seek to maximize ' ( van Klaveren , 1957 ) . The same thing is pointed out by others such as Leff ( 1964 ) ...
... economics . For example , ' A corrupt civil servant regards his public offices as a business , the income of which he will ... seek to maximize ' ( van Klaveren , 1957 ) . The same thing is pointed out by others such as Leff ( 1964 ) ...
˹éÒ 1890
... economic growth ' ( Leff , 1964 ; Bayley , 1966 ; Nye , 1967 ) . It was considered to be efficient for minimizing ... economic development as a result of the analysis of data in international comparisons ( Mauro , 1995 ; Bardhan , 1997 ) ...
... economic growth ' ( Leff , 1964 ; Bayley , 1966 ; Nye , 1967 ) . It was considered to be efficient for minimizing ... economic development as a result of the analysis of data in international comparisons ( Mauro , 1995 ; Bardhan , 1997 ) ...
˹éÒ 1892
... economics, including political corruption, and work towards a plan for comprehensive reform. But, we cannot yet know ... economic development. After this fact became apparent, theories denouncing political clientelism and political ...
... economics, including political corruption, and work towards a plan for comprehensive reform. But, we cannot yet know ... economic development. After this fact became apparent, theories denouncing political clientelism and political ...
˹éÒ 1899
... economic exchanges ' . While exchanges in a normal market are thought to be horizontal specific exchanges between two parties , there are vertical specific exchanges in social relationships . For example , a transaction between two ...
... economic exchanges ' . While exchanges in a normal market are thought to be horizontal specific exchanges between two parties , there are vertical specific exchanges in social relationships . For example , a transaction between two ...
à¹×éÍËÒ
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes