The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisColumbia University Press, 1 ต.ค. 2010 - 304 หน้า The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 6 - 10 จาก 83
หน้า 7
... increases vulnerability to foreign exchange crises. The final, most heated controversy surrounded the policy content of IMF-supported programs. Critics argued that fiscal and monetary policy tightening had perverse effects (Radelet and ...
... increases vulnerability to foreign exchange crises. The final, most heated controversy surrounded the policy content of IMF-supported programs. Critics argued that fiscal and monetary policy tightening had perverse effects (Radelet and ...
หน้า 8
... increase in interest rates, a decline in real wages, or—if necessary—an adjustment of the peg. It is thus not economic developments alone that trigger the exit of investors, but the expectation that the government is unwilling or unable ...
... increase in interest rates, a decline in real wages, or—if necessary—an adjustment of the peg. It is thus not economic developments alone that trigger the exit of investors, but the expectation that the government is unwilling or unable ...
หน้า 10
... increase vulnerability to shocks, typically by weakening the regulatory process. Underneath these discrete policy problems lie deeper political and institutional features of business-government relations in the region. In Western ...
... increase vulnerability to shocks, typically by weakening the regulatory process. Underneath these discrete policy problems lie deeper political and institutional features of business-government relations in the region. In Western ...
หน้า 13
... increased openness to trade and investment. The crisis only underlined that governments in the region did not have good information on those vulnerable to crises, and the coverage in place was limited in both scope and depth. Although ...
... increased openness to trade and investment. The crisis only underlined that governments in the region did not have good information on those vulnerable to crises, and the coverage in place was limited in both scope and depth. Although ...
หน้า 14
... Economic Vulnerability Rapid lending growth, an increase. 14 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 16 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 1. Institute for International Economics | http://www.iie.com.
... Economic Vulnerability Rapid lending growth, an increase. 14 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 16 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 1. Institute for International Economics | http://www.iie.com.
เนื้อหา
1 | |
15 | |
Ch
2 Incumbent Governments and the Politics of Crisis Management | 47 |
Ch 3 Crisis Political Change and Economic Reform | 86 |
Ch 4 The Politics of Financial and Corporate Restructuring | 139 |
Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract | 183 |
A New Asian Miracle | 217 |
References | 239 |
Index | 255 |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
administrative Anwar Asia ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS assets authoritarian banking sector bankruptcy billion bumiputra business-government relations capital central bank chaebol chapter Chinese Chuan CLOB coalition controls corporate governance corporate restructuring corruption countries country’s crises CRISIS MANAGEMENT Danaharta debt democracies democratic Development Eastern Economic Review ECONOMIC REFORM effects efforts elections electoral finance companies financial and corporate financial institutions financial sector firms fiscal foreign funds Golkar government’s groups growth Habibie Hanbo IBRA important incentives increase INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS Indonesia industrial initial interest investment investors issues Jomo Kim Dae Jung Kim Young Kim Young Sam labor legislative liberalization Mahathir Malaysia ment moral hazard National opposition particularly party percent Philippines POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMY president private sector problems recapitalization region regulatory Renong ringgit risk role rule share social contract South Korea state-owned strategy substantial Suharto Table Thai Thailand tion transparency UMNO urban vulnerable World Bank