Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 ÁÕ.¤. 2017 - 248 ˹éÒ Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
¨Ò¡´éÒ¹ã¹Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í
¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 6 - 10 ¨Ò¡ 18
˹éÒ 1880
... patron-client relationship'. At first the concept of clientelism was used in the field of cultural or social anthropology. Then, from the 1970s, it was introduced into the field of comparative politics by researchers working in ...
... patron-client relationship'. At first the concept of clientelism was used in the field of cultural or social anthropology. Then, from the 1970s, it was introduced into the field of comparative politics by researchers working in ...
˹éÒ 1881
... Patron-client relationships' were understood as dyad relationships within a strict hierarchy where resources, as rewards, were mutually exchanged between patrons and clients. It was thought these types of exchanges had loosely existed ...
... Patron-client relationships' were understood as dyad relationships within a strict hierarchy where resources, as rewards, were mutually exchanged between patrons and clients. It was thought these types of exchanges had loosely existed ...
˹éÒ 1882
Junichi Kawata. 2. Secondly, it was actually assumed that these patron-client exchange relationships within a ... clients. For instance, in the landlord-farmer relationship, it can actually be said that the farmers are exploited by the ...
Junichi Kawata. 2. Secondly, it was actually assumed that these patron-client exchange relationships within a ... clients. For instance, in the landlord-farmer relationship, it can actually be said that the farmers are exploited by the ...
˹éÒ 1885
... patrons and clients and , as a result , obstructs ' public ' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron - client arrangement . In terms of public philosophy , the presumed purpose of ' innate politics ...
... patrons and clients and , as a result , obstructs ' public ' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron - client arrangement . In terms of public philosophy , the presumed purpose of ' innate politics ...
˹éÒ 1901
... patron - client relationship within a hierarchy is maintained by fair provisions of resources belonging to the patron ( such as the fruits of his wisdom or the use of his private property ) and no unjust political influence is exerted ...
... patron - client relationship within a hierarchy is maintained by fair provisions of resources belonging to the patron ( such as the fruits of his wisdom or the use of his private property ) and no unjust political influence is exerted ...
à¹×éÍËÒ
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes