Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 11 - 15 จาก 43
หน้า 1890
... theories onmodernization and to theories on political development , as evidenced by the participation of famous theorists like James C. Scott and Samuel P. Huntington . There was an element of cynicism towards moral percepts in those ...
... theories onmodernization and to theories on political development , as evidenced by the participation of famous theorists like James C. Scott and Samuel P. Huntington . There was an element of cynicism towards moral percepts in those ...
หน้า 1892
... theories of political corruption in this way is thus very similar to the development of theories of political clientelism. What is ... theories of political clientelism. Definitions from a Republican Theory of Political Corruption The reason.
... theories of political corruption in this way is thus very similar to the development of theories of political clientelism. What is ... theories of political clientelism. Definitions from a Republican Theory of Political Corruption The reason.
หน้า 1893
Junichi Kawata. Definitions. from. a. Republican. Theory. of. Political. Corruption. The reason why theories of political corruption and political clientelism have so much in common can be found in the fact that both political corruption ...
Junichi Kawata. Definitions. from. a. Republican. Theory. of. Political. Corruption. The reason why theories of political corruption and political clientelism have so much in common can be found in the fact that both political corruption ...
หน้า 1894
... political corruption, that is, public-office-centered, and the third definition, that is, public-interest-centered, are more relevant than the other definitions mentioned above. As with theories of political clientelism, when we make a ...
... political corruption, that is, public-office-centered, and the third definition, that is, public-interest-centered, are more relevant than the other definitions mentioned above. As with theories of political clientelism, when we make a ...
หน้า 1895
... government was regarded as the cause of political decline and theories of mixed governments were devised in order to stop , as far as possible , this fatal degeneration . ' Corruption ' here is used in the sense of ' making something ...
... government was regarded as the cause of political decline and theories of mixed governments were devised in order to stop , as far as possible , this fatal degeneration . ' Corruption ' here is used in the sense of ' making something ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes