Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 6 - 10 จาก 16
หน้า 1886
... vertical relationships : it concentrates resources such as citizens ' taxes under the auspices of official authority and brings about general ' public ' benefits by using these resources for ordinary citizens . On the other hand ...
... vertical relationships : it concentrates resources such as citizens ' taxes under the auspices of official authority and brings about general ' public ' benefits by using these resources for ordinary citizens . On the other hand ...
หน้า 1898
... vertical generalized exchanges , while political clientelism can be seen in terms of vertical limited exchanges . Other than generalized or limited exchanges , another concept defining exchange can be put forward . This type of ...
... vertical generalized exchanges , while political clientelism can be seen in terms of vertical limited exchanges . Other than generalized or limited exchanges , another concept defining exchange can be put forward . This type of ...
หน้า 1899
... vertical specific exchanges in social relationships . For example , a transaction between two parties in a hierarchy corresponds to this vertical specific exchange and bribery is a typical outcome of this . Suppose a person in a ...
... vertical specific exchanges in social relationships . For example , a transaction between two parties in a hierarchy corresponds to this vertical specific exchange and bribery is a typical outcome of this . Suppose a person in a ...
หน้า 1900
... vertical limited exchange' and 'bribery = vertical specified exchange'. This is why della Porta and Vannucci (1999) call these exchanges 'corrupt exchanges' and consider the interruption of vertical general exchanges as an encroachment ...
... vertical limited exchange' and 'bribery = vertical specified exchange'. This is why della Porta and Vannucci (1999) call these exchanges 'corrupt exchanges' and consider the interruption of vertical general exchanges as an encroachment ...
หน้า 1901
... vertical general exchange realization of public interests ' , it cannot be called political corruption . For instance , if a dyad patron - client relationship within a hierarchy is maintained by fair provisions of resources belonging to ...
... vertical general exchange realization of public interests ' , it cannot be called political corruption . For instance , if a dyad patron - client relationship within a hierarchy is maintained by fair provisions of resources belonging to ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes