The Political Economy of the Asian Financial CrisisColumbia University Press, 1 ต.ค. 2010 - 304 หน้า The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 6 - 10 จาก 48
หน้า 5
... vulnerability in South Korea was the fact that the maturity profile of external debt was increasingly skewed toward the short run, partly as a result of policy. In Southeast Asia, much private borrowing, for example by ethnic Chinese ...
... vulnerability in South Korea was the fact that the maturity profile of external debt was increasingly skewed toward the short run, partly as a result of policy. In Southeast Asia, much private borrowing, for example by ethnic Chinese ...
หน้า 6
... vulnerability be reduced by maintaining capital controls, or at least exercising extreme caution in their removal? Interestingly, none of Malaysia's neighbors followed Mahathir's departure from orthodoxy, although the international ...
... vulnerability be reduced by maintaining capital controls, or at least exercising extreme caution in their removal? Interestingly, none of Malaysia's neighbors followed Mahathir's departure from orthodoxy, although the international ...
หน้า 7
... vulnerability to foreign exchange crises. The final, most heated controversy surrounded the policy content of IMF-supported programs. Critics argued that fiscal and monetary policy tightening had perverse effects (Radelet and Sachs ...
... vulnerability to foreign exchange crises. The final, most heated controversy surrounded the policy content of IMF-supported programs. Critics argued that fiscal and monetary policy tightening had perverse effects (Radelet and Sachs ...
หน้า 8
... vulnerability and moral hazard is not simply bad policies but the politics and institutions that generate them. If most accounts by economists paid only passing attention to. 7. Radelet and Sachs (1998a) revert to these factors at a ...
... vulnerability and moral hazard is not simply bad policies but the politics and institutions that generate them. If most accounts by economists paid only passing attention to. 7. Radelet and Sachs (1998a) revert to these factors at a ...
หน้า 10
... vulnerability to shocks, typically by weakening the regulatory process. Underneath these discrete policy problems lie deeper political and institutional features of business-government relations in the region. In Western commentary ...
... vulnerability to shocks, typically by weakening the regulatory process. Underneath these discrete policy problems lie deeper political and institutional features of business-government relations in the region. In Western commentary ...
เนื้อหา
1 | |
15 | |
Ch
2 Incumbent Governments and the Politics of Crisis Management | 47 |
Ch 3 Crisis Political Change and Economic Reform | 86 |
Ch 4 The Politics of Financial and Corporate Restructuring | 139 |
Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract | 183 |
A New Asian Miracle | 217 |
References | 239 |
Index | 255 |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
administrative Anwar Asia ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS assets authoritarian banking sector bankruptcy billion bumiputra business-government relations capital central bank chaebol chapter Chinese Chuan CLOB coalition controls corporate governance corporate restructuring corruption countries country’s crises CRISIS MANAGEMENT Danaharta debt democracies democratic Development Eastern Economic Review ECONOMIC REFORM effects efforts elections electoral finance companies financial and corporate financial institutions financial sector firms fiscal foreign funds Golkar government’s groups growth Habibie Hanbo IBRA important incentives increase INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS Indonesia industrial initial interest investment investors issues Jomo Kim Dae Jung Kim Young Kim Young Sam labor legislative liberalization Mahathir Malaysia ment moral hazard National opposition particularly party percent Philippines POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMY president private sector problems recapitalization region regulatory Renong ringgit risk role rule share social contract South Korea state-owned strategy substantial Suharto Table Thai Thailand tion transparency UMNO urban vulnerable World Bank