...Hegelian "universality") of depriving action of the "oomph" that alone motivates it. David Hume wrote that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions,...to any other office than to serve and obey them," and Bernard Williams argued that genuine reasons are all "internal" to the agent for whom they are...

...speaking, there is no such thing as a combat between reason and passion. 'Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend...to any other office than to serve and obey them.' 4 The phraseology is wantonly paradoxical in sound, because in his early treatise Hume aimed at being...

...passion and of reason', nonetheless fell into this trap when he added that 'reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend...to any other office than to serve and obey them'. Making these two abstractions into Employer and Employed is no better than setting them to fight it...

...argued. Earlier still, the British philosopher David Hume proclaimed that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend...to any other office than to serve and obey them." Even today most people assume that emotions cloud our mind and make us do things that are unwise, as...

...sorts of mental entities that can oppose one another."11 Hume declares, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (THN 2.3.3, p. 415). Reason by itself cannot produce action, nor can it give rise to volition or prevent...

...philosopher David Hume was closer to the truth than was Plato when he said, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."26 In sum, the rider is an advisor or servant; not a king, president, or charioteer with a firm...

...indeed cannot, hope to be the element that selects what we want. As he states: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.61 Reason here is not the driving force; it is, as I have heard some call it, 'a gun for hire'....

...and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."50 According to Hume, reason is capable of telling us that if we do X, Y will result. It is incapable...

...authoritative statement in David Hume's assertion that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Hume 1978, 415, vol. 2, sec. 3.3). Recently the issue has been tackled by Nozick (1993, 139ff.), who...

...As an empiricist, Hume subordinates reason to passions and insists that reason is 'wholly inactive' and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. This conception is radically false. Reason is more properly regarded as a regulative principle which...