...phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : ... to think of an object as desirable (unless for the...of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing ; and ... to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical...

...phenomenon; in strictness of language two different modes of naming the same psychological fact— to think of an object as desirable (unless for the...its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant arc one ami the same thing; and to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant...

...satisfaction we find our welfare, our pleasure, our happiness, our good. As John Stuart Mill writes: "To think of an object as desirable (unless for the...of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing, and to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical...

...painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological...think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; ajid that to desire anything^^except-in- ^xroportion as the idea of it is pleasant, Is a physical and...

...painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : that to think of an object äs desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it äs pleasant, are one and...

...phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : ... to think of an object as desirable (unless for the...of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing ; and ... to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical...

...are the sole evidence of what is desirable, 'to think of an object as desirable [for its own sake], and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing' (1861a, pp. 237-8). Mill expects that the main objection to his psychological proof will be, not that...

...freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends' (p. 10),' and again at the end of his argument To think of an object as desirable (unless for the...think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing' (p. 58) Well, I perfectly 1 Moore's references throughout his discussion of Mill are to the latter's...

...inseparable," which he then reiterates in different words, "to think of a thing as desirable . . . and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing." All this means is that any object desired (for its own sake) is inseparably associated with pleasure....

...University of Nebraska in 1989. 1. See, eg, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Harlsett, 1979), where he says that "to think of an object as desirable (unless for...of it as pleasant are one and the same thing; and ... to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical...