...We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (Hume, 1740, 1888) Thus reason does not judge or attempt to modify our 'passions', as some might think....

...and the work of Spencer on progress was the basis for the claim to supremacy of Anglo-Saxons. "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" — a statement as true of this quotation and of Hume's writings as of others. Perhaps the obsession...

...merely as restraints on conduct (Stephen 1864, pp. 69-70). Thus we see Hume's well-worn dictum - "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Hume 1739/40, p. 462) - resurrected in support of a moral philosophy justifying external restraints...

...reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger because 'reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' (Hume, 1888, Book II, pt. 3, section 3). Hobbes makes reason subordinate to the demands of the appetites...

...spirit and emotion, credited with much of the superiority of "Western" man, is demolished. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Treatise, II, III, Section ii, p. 41 5). The moral at the end of Book I of the Treatise, said Baier,...

...derived from the senses, and hence that reason alone could never supply motives for action. Hence 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them'10 - a point of view not dissimilar from the one advanced by the neurologist Damasio in recent...

...the radical assertion that far from being the sovereign power of the human mind, "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Hume 1888: 415). If we take Hume to be the central figure of eighteenth-century Scottish thought,...

...ihrem eigentlichen Sinne nach ist und bleibt nichts anderes als die Sklavin der Affekte: „Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than serve and obey them."1 So lautet die Pointe von Humes Rationalismuskritik. In ihr ist als Konsequenz...

...was no such thing as that civil war between reason and the passions pretended by Plato: 'Reason . . . can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.' Personal identity, in short, was something in flux, discontinuous, confusing and complicated. Hume...

...of the combat of passion and of reason', nonetheless fell into this trap when he added that 'reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions,...to any other office than to serve and obey them'. Making these two abstractions into Employer and Employed is no better than setting them to fight it...