 | Kentucky. Court of Appeals, James Hughes, Achilles Sneed, Martin D. Hardin, George Minos Bibb, Alexander Keith Marshall, William Littell - 1916 - 988 หน้า
...rules differing from it, by whatever court announced, are not law. Where a former decision is overruled the judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to...vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. "For," as said by Blackstone, "if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it... | |
 | 1892 - 272 หน้า
...the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law." ' And again he says that if a "former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it...sentence was bad law, but that it was not law ; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined."' All of which... | |
 | 1903 - 408 หน้า
..." But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vendic ite the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former deaision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but... | |
 | Henry J. Bourguignon - 2004 - 332 หน้า
...comfortable applying to the law of nations. Blackstone asserted: 'But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate...sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined. And hence it... | |
 | Susan W. Brenner - 394 หน้า
...of the common law.. . . Id. at 60 (emphasis added). Blackstone notes that "if it be found that [a] former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it...sentence was bad law, but that it was not law, that is, that it is not the established custom of the reahn, as has been erroneously determined" (id. at 70).... | |
 | Daniel J. Boorstin - 1996 - 289 หน้า
...statement of Blackstone's attitude to precedent. See, for example, the statement quoted in the text, that "if it be found that the former decision is manifestly...that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not lav, that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined."... | |
 | St. George Tucker, William Blackstone - 2000 - 3301 หน้า
...reasonf much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate...one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that she former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared,-not that such a sentence was bad... | |
 | Thomas A. Street - 1999 - 540 หน้า
...In the same connection, speaking of overruled cases he adds: " But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate...a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law." This theory was criticised by Bentham, and Austin denounced " the childish fiction employed by our... | |
 | Kermit Hall - 2000 - 446 หน้า
...the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason."31 But, even in such cases, subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate...sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined." On the basis of... | |
 | Harold J. Spaeth, Jeffrey A. Segal - 2001 - 380 หน้า
...reason: much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old law from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust,... | |
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But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was... 
