Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
หน้า 1877
... Porta, D. (1992), Lo scambio occulto: Casi di corruzione politica in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna. della Porta, D. and Mény, Y. (eds) (1999), Democracy and Corruption in Europe, Pinter, London. della Porta, D. and Vannucci, A. (1999) ...
... Porta, D. (1992), Lo scambio occulto: Casi di corruzione politica in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna. della Porta, D. and Mény, Y. (eds) (1999), Democracy and Corruption in Europe, Pinter, London. della Porta, D. and Vannucci, A. (1999) ...
หน้า 1898
... Porta and Vannucci ( 1999 ) conclude that political corruption is a ' corrupt exchange ' . They look upon corruption as ' a network of illegal exchanges ' and , using the ' principal - agent ' theory , they present the following model ...
... Porta and Vannucci ( 1999 ) conclude that political corruption is a ' corrupt exchange ' . They look upon corruption as ' a network of illegal exchanges ' and , using the ' principal - agent ' theory , they present the following model ...
หน้า 1900
... Porta and Vannucci (1999) call these exchanges 'corrupt exchanges' and consider the interruption of vertical general exchanges as an encroachment on interests belonging to the 'principal'. Therefore, political corruption is the general ...
... Porta and Vannucci (1999) call these exchanges 'corrupt exchanges' and consider the interruption of vertical general exchanges as an encroachment on interests belonging to the 'principal'. Therefore, political corruption is the general ...
หน้า 1905
... Porta and Vannucci, 1999).12 So, 'small corruption/medium corruption/grand corruption' are equivalent to 'oshoku (bnbery)/fuhai (corruption)/kouzou oshoku or kouzou fuhai (structural bribery or structural corruption)' in Japanese ...
... Porta and Vannucci, 1999).12 So, 'small corruption/medium corruption/grand corruption' are equivalent to 'oshoku (bnbery)/fuhai (corruption)/kouzou oshoku or kouzou fuhai (structural bribery or structural corruption)' in Japanese ...
หน้า 1907
... Porta and Vannucci, 1999, chapter 6). This can correspond to personal political corruption in linked political corruption. Political organizations (the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, and so on) and business ...
... Porta and Vannucci, 1999, chapter 6). This can correspond to personal political corruption in linked political corruption. Political organizations (the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, and so on) and business ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes