Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismPast modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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Included in this theoretical understanding of the phenomena are clientelism (= vertical limited exchange), bribery involving one transaction at a time (= vertical specific exchange) and deprivation caused by authorities acting alone and ...
Included in this theoretical understanding of the phenomena are clientelism (= vertical limited exchange), bribery involving one transaction at a time (= vertical specific exchange) and deprivation caused by authorities acting alone and ...
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In terms of structuralism phenomena such as political clientelism and bribery are deeply grounded in the human mind, as vertical limited exchanges and vertical specific exchanges. So long as the human mind remains universally similar, ...
In terms of structuralism phenomena such as political clientelism and bribery are deeply grounded in the human mind, as vertical limited exchanges and vertical specific exchanges. So long as the human mind remains universally similar, ...
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For instance it is relatively easy to give and take bribery in clientelistic cultures, and bribery itself is organized through the relationship between the briber, such as an enterprise, and the bribetaker, such as politicians and ...
For instance it is relatively easy to give and take bribery in clientelistic cultures, and bribery itself is organized through the relationship between the briber, such as an enterprise, and the bribetaker, such as politicians and ...
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Needless to say, 'small corruption = bribery' involving individual officials is an occurrence that should be criticized as a misuse of power. But, in a case in which there is 'grand corruption = structural bribery' that involves an ...
Needless to say, 'small corruption = bribery' involving individual officials is an occurrence that should be criticized as a misuse of power. But, in a case in which there is 'grand corruption = structural bribery' that involves an ...
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Kawakami, K. (2003), Corruption and Bribery — Reality Concerning the Detection of Corruption and Bribery, Koudansha, Tokyo. Key, Jr., V.O. (1936), The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States, University of Chicago Libraries, ...
Kawakami, K. (2003), Corruption and Bribery — Reality Concerning the Detection of Corruption and Bribery, Koudansha, Tokyo. Key, Jr., V.O. (1936), The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States, University of Chicago Libraries, ...
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Theoretical | |
Multilevel Disjuncture | |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian Democrats | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and the Emergence | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
Index | |
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actors administration antifraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra DC factions DC’s Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Giovanni Falcone Heidenheimer illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction LDP’s legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi mainstream Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring multilevel Nakasone Palermo parliamentary particularistic party leaders party’s patronclient pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships role RoseAckerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes
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| ª×èÍ˹ѧÊ×Í | Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism |
| ºÃóҸԡÒà | Junichi Kawata |
| ¼Ùé¨Ñ´¾ÔÁ¾ì | Routledge, 2017 |
| ISBN | 1351949934, 9781351949934 |
| ¤ÇÒÁÂÒÇ | 248 ˹éÒ |
| Êè§ÍÍ¡¡ÒÃÍéÒ§ÍÔ§ | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |