Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
หน้า 1873
... politico - economics by utilizing public works ( especially engineering works and the business contract of harbors ) or money laundering . Moreover , the Mafia has been active behind the scenes in the last thirty years as.
... politico - economics by utilizing public works ( especially engineering works and the business contract of harbors ) or money laundering . Moreover , the Mafia has been active behind the scenes in the last thirty years as.
หน้า 1874
... economic transformation of southern Italy in the last twenty years nevertheless seems to offer the possibility of different interpretations of changing clientelism in some zones of the region. Some authors insist that clientelism not ...
... economic transformation of southern Italy in the last twenty years nevertheless seems to offer the possibility of different interpretations of changing clientelism in some zones of the region. Some authors insist that clientelism not ...
หน้า 1875
Junichi Kawata. economic , and political development , but , on occasion , can bring economic benefits . These scholars call these cases ' virtuous ' or ' enlightened ' clientelism . In Chapter 9 , Yohei Nakayama shows how political ...
Junichi Kawata. economic , and political development , but , on occasion , can bring economic benefits . These scholars call these cases ' virtuous ' or ' enlightened ' clientelism . In Chapter 9 , Yohei Nakayama shows how political ...
หน้า 1879
... Economy, Academic Press, New York. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Schmidt, S. W. (1974), 'Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers? Clientelism in ...
... Economy, Academic Press, New York. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Schmidt, S. W. (1974), 'Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers? Clientelism in ...
หน้า 1881
... economic development advanced. These commonly accepted theories in the 1970s recognized these relationships as being based on mutual exchanges, so these theories on clientelism can be called 'theories on dyadic exchange relations'.2 ...
... economic development advanced. These commonly accepted theories in the 1970s recognized these relationships as being based on mutual exchanges, so these theories on clientelism can be called 'theories on dyadic exchange relations'.2 ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes